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Abstract 
This   study   explores   implications   of  the  Kenyan   government’s   anti-terror strategies for ethnic 
Somalis. This is done through the lense of securitization theory as accounted for by 
Copenhagen School theorists and Juha A. Vuori. The study aims to analyze historical 
descriptive inferences, in order to contextualize the Somali-Kenyan relational narrative. 
Through speech act analyses, it is argued that, the Kenyan government, exemplified through 
speech acts of William Ruto and Ole Lenku, generates securitization moves. It is done in 
order to legitimize actions, beyond normal political procedure, in the name of counter-
terrorism. The speech acts are analyzed as implicit securitizations of ethnic Somalis living in 
Kenya   as  an  ‘existential   threat’   to  the  referent   object  of  ‘Kenya’   and  ‘Kenyans’.   It  is   further  
explored, how these securitization moves have an effect on the local community in the 
Somali-dominated area Eastleigh, Nairobi. This is explored through personal narratives and 
realities of ethnic Somalis, which contribute to the construction of the analytical concepts of 
political and cultural security. 
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When Global War on Terror Becomes Local: A Study of 
Somalis in Eastleigh 
The terror attack on World Trade Center and Pentagon, executed by the transnational terror 
network, al-Qaeda the 9th of September 2001 (9/11), left the international society in a state of 
shock (Heywood, 2014B, p. 301). Nevertheless, the fear of terrorism paved the way for a 
demand for the international society to take collective actions to prevent future terror attacks. 
Thereby 9/11 became the onset for an international consensus on a war against terrorism, as it 
was articulated as an attack against the civilized population (Crenshaw, 2013, p. 79). 
However, following 9/11 events related to the Global War on Terror (GWOT) have had 
consequences for people elsewhere. People, whose part of the conflict is non-existent, 
nevertheless, 9/11 still presents a huge mark in their lives.    
 
The international consensus against terror is addressed by Richard Jackson, according to 
whom, articulation of a war on terror requires the construction of a new language. This 
language should be able to shape a social reality, wherein terrorism is articulated as a threat 
that   is   able  to  destroy   civilization   for   “ordinary people”   (Jackson,   2005,  pp.  1-2). For 
Jackson, there is no doubt that the discourse constructed in the aftermath of 9/11 was not 
accidental. The discourse constructed for the language, by the Bush administration1, did not 
only change the American perception of terror. It influenced the general discourse on the 
global level, through the constructed presumption that terror is a global phenomenon, and 
therefore requires global measures. In that way, the construction of a certain discourse 
became a, rather calculated, way of legitimizing the extraordinary actions that followed the 
terror attacks (ibid., p. 2). By time it became evident that not only USA was a target of 
terrorism. Countries such as Spain, Turkey, and England experienced attacks, not to mention 
the East African country, Kenya which both before and after 9/11 has been a victim of 
terrorism (Carsten, 2012; Laing, 2013). The attacks contributed to the understanding of terror 
as a threat of global character. What these countries had in common was not only being 
victims of terror, but also having a common enemy. 
Even though other countries have been attacked by terror before 9/11, it was the articulation 
of a global war on terror following the attack on U.S. soil, which changed the discourse, and 
the distinct nature of this security threat. It did so by the use of a specific semantic language 
of  ‘us   and  them’.   As  Bush   stated:   “every  nation and every region now has a decision to 
                                                 
1 The administration in power at that time 
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make,  either  you  are  with  us  or  you  are  with  the  terrorists” (Cheney, 2009) an ultimatum for 
the international society to join USA in the war against terror, was articulated. 
 
In this regard, it is essential to explore in which aspects this discourse of terrorism, as a 
global security threat, influences actions taken by governments at a political level. 
However, applying this discursive perspective suggests that a study writes itself within a 
constructivist framework,   where   state’s  ideas   and  intentions   are  shaped  by  “social norms, 
rules, understandings, and relationships we have with others”  (Jackson  &  Sørensen,   2010,  p.  
219). This approach emphasizes the role of the international society. Thus, when examining 
how states approach the war on terrorism, one must be aware that states act within the frame 
of an international society. Their actions are thus under influence by the international society 
e.g. through discourse and actions. In this context it should be understood as how terrorism, 
and the fight against terror, is articulated, interpreted, and acted upon.  
 
Following 9/11 the American global perspective on security and counter-terrorism strategies, 
U.S. security aid to Kenya increased (Merservey, 2015). Thus, the U.S. counter-terrorism 
strategy extents in to East-Africa. The GWOT should therefore be perceived as a 
phenomenon, exceeding beyond the Western World, and within other cultures and political 
environments. The construction of a GWOT-language has become transnational and in order 
to understand the effects, one cannot limit the research area to national foreign policies of the 
U.S. In the case of counter-terrorism in Kenya, it is thus relevant to understand, how the 
discourse of GWOT, as presented by the U.S., can be localized and interpreted in a different 
political, cultural, and historical setting. This study thus seeks to explore how the global 
security perspective is made relevant and practiced in the Kenyan context. 
Terrorism in Kenya 
Kenya is one of the highest-ranking countries affected by terror. The country was ranked on 
the   “Global Terrorism Index 2014”  as  number   twelve,   and  placed   just   under   countries   such   as  
Iraq,  Afghanistan,   Syria,   and  Somalia   (“Global   Terrorism   Index”,   2014,  p.  8). Kenya has 
been a target of terrorism for more than three decades, starting early 1975, and continuing 
sporadic into the 1980 with the attack in the capital, Nairobi, New Year's Eve. Being a target 
of  terrorism   followed   Kenya   to  the  90’s  by  another   attack in 1998 on the U.S. Embassy in 
Nairobi; and again in 2002 where a car bomb exploded in Mombasa at the same time as a 
missile was fired against a plane in Mombasa airport (Laing, 2013). In the new millennium 
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the Somalia based, Islamist, terror organization, al-Shabaab, had begun to carry out attacks 
and kidnappings of Kenyans and foreigners in the Northern part of Kenya (Franklin, 2015). 
Attacks by al-Shabaab only increased after the military intervention of Somalia by Kenya in 
2011  (“Who   are  Somalia’s   al-Shabab?”,   2015).  This   operation   was  called   “Operation  Linda  
Nchi”, which is translated to “Operation  Protect  the  Nation”. The operation was aimed at 
defeating al-Shabaab, why Kenyan soldiers are still present in Somalia today (Franklin, 
2015). However, it is not the first time Kenya is militarily present in Somalia. Kenya 
intervened   in  Somalia   with   military   means   during   the   civil   wars   in   the   early   1990’s.  Back  
then, the situation in Somalia triggered large flows of refugees from Somalia to Kenya. This 
is one of the factors explaining, why all registered refugees in the Dadaab refugee camps in 
Kenya today are of Somali origin (Jamaa, 2006; UNHCR, 2015). The five Dadaab refugee 
camps   all   together   form   the  world’s   biggest   refugee   camp   inhabited   by  334.662  registered 
refugees   as  of  May  2015  (“Dadaab   Refugee   Camps”,   n.d.;;  UNHCR,  2015).  Hundreds   of  
thousands ethnic Somali refugees have therefore been living in Kenya for decades. Many of 
whom   have   settled   down  as  urban   refugees   in   one  of  Nairobi’s   neighborhoods, an area called 
Eastleigh, where they have made a life for themselves (Herz, 2008, pp. 1, 7-9). However, 
literature and rights-reports suggest that ethnic Somalis living in Kenya as either citizen's, 
urban refugees, or refugees in the camps are likely to be discriminated due to their ethnic 
origin (Lind & Howell, 2010, p. 336; The Equal Rights Trust, 2012, p. IV; Campbell, 2005, 
p. 10; KNHCR, 2007, p. 6; Lindley, 2011, p. 21). This claim has been rejected by the Kenyan 
government and President Uhuru Kenyatta (Sahara Tribune, 2014). Nevertheless, the Deputy 
President, William Ruto, has lately announced a relocation of refugees and the Dadaab 
refugee camp to be closed (NTV Kenya, 2015; KTN Kenya, 2015). As issues of refugees 
seem to rise in the aftermath of terror-attacks, it is essential to examine how actions and 
articulations of anti-terrorism might develop in light of earlier anti-terrorism initiatives, and 
in relation to the Somali diaspora in Kenya. 
Targeting the Somali Diaspora?  
The Kenyan government has taken in different means, countering the terror threat al-Shabaab 
poses to national security. Literature on Kenyan anti-terror strategies suggests that measures 
taken by the government have contributed to a profiling and discrimination of certain 
minority groups   namely   Muslims   and  Somalis   (Simpson   &  Laper,   2013;;  “Somalis   are  
scapegoats”,   2014;;  Campbell,   2006,  p. 401; Prestholdt, 2011, p. 4). 
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One  area  has  been  a  focal   point   of  the  government’s   anti-terror strategy. This is the Somali 
dominated neighborhood of Eastleigh, located in the Central-Eastern part of Nairobi. The 
area is characterized as a busy business center, where many locals come to buy cheap goods. 
However, the area has been a center for several terror attacks such as bomb and grenade 
explosions (“Twin   Blasts”,   2012).  Because   of  this,   the   area  has  been  of  interest   to  the  
government in terms of directing anti-terror operations ,which was most dramatically 
expressed by launching the Usalama Watch Operation in April 2014. The aim of the 
operation was to enhance security in the area, and clean up all activities outside the law, 
which   inter   alia   resulted   in   the  arrestment   of  many   illegal   refugees   (“Kenya:   End  Abusive  
Round-Ups”,   2014).  The  operation   was  exposed  to  extensive   critique   from   several   human  
rights organizations, who argued that the operation carried out by the police was 
discriminatory,   unjustified,   and  a  means   of  scapegoating   the  Somali   residents   (“Somalis   are  
scapegoats”,   2014;;  “Kenya:   End  Abusive   Round-Ups”,   2014;;  Simpson   &  Laper,   2013).  
These accusations of violations of rights have not been acknowledged by the government, 
who calls for drastic measures to counter drastic terror threats. In this regard different 
opinions and discourses are contesting for dominance and clout in order to legit imize various 
agendas. 
Purpose of Study 
This study aims to examine how the Kenyan government articulates the threat from terrorism, 
and how it responds towards it. The first part of the study is examined through the lenses of 
securitization theory and the study of language and discourse, while the second part includes 
political- and cultural security as an analytical focus. The study aims to investigate if ethnic 
Somalis living in Eastleigh experience that their political and cultural security are influenced, 
by the discourse of the Kenyan government, and leads to the following problem statement: 
How  can  the  Kenyan  government’s  anti-terror operations in Eastleigh be understood through 
securitization  theory  and  how  does  it  affect  local  ethnic  Somalis’  cultural and political 
security? 
 
Further, three sub-questions have been developed in order to examine the assumption above: 
 How has a discourse of Somalis in Kenya been constructed as a threat? 
 How can the Kenyan government's articulations of anti-terror strategies be examined, 
through   Copenhagen   School’s   theoretical   framework   of  securitization? 
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 How can we understand narratives presented by ethnic Somalis in relation to    
cultural- and political security?  
Methodological Approach  
The methodological framework and approach of this study is highly influenced by a choice of 
dispositioning the study in two analyses, providing each their perspective on security. The 
one  of  “Constructing a Narrative of Alienation”  builds   on  the  theoretical   framework   of  the  
Copenhagen School theory (CS) of Securitization, though adjusted to encompass a more 
comprehensive perception of the speech act by Vuori. The second one of,”Perceptions of 
Security  in  Eastleigh” analyzes from the perspective of Somalis, and includes our 
operationalization of political- and cultural security as analytical tools. Both analyses aim to 
study our overall problem statement from the assumption that Ethnic Somalis living in 
Eastleigh   are  securitized   through   the  Kenyan   government’s   speech  acts. 
 
However, whereas the first analysis investigates, how the idea that an alienating narrative of 
Somalis in Kenya as a threat has been constructed, the second analysis is interested in the 
individual   Somalis’   perception   and   construction   of  their   political   and  cultural   security. The 
two analyses have each a different theoretical and methodological approach which will be 
elaborated on in “Methods and Methodologies”.   Nevertheless,   this   division   of  the   analyses  
into two addresses and embraces the complexity in this specific field of interest, and enables 
us to study the perspectives of both the government and the Somali community in Nairobi.     
The following sections will introduce the reader to the theoretical and methodological 
framework taken in this study. 
Theoretical Framework 
The forthcoming section will introduce the reader to the theoretical framework of this study. 
Included   is   the  Copenhagen   School‘s   (CS)  theory  of   securitization   in   light   of  Juha  A.  Vuori’s  
critique. The paragraphs will account for securitization theory, the military- and the societal 
sector. Furthermore a discussion of critiques of the CS and lastly an account for our position 
when using the theory. 
Copenhagen School 
Within   the  Copenhagen   Research   Institute   in   the  1990’s,  a constructivist approach to security 
studies was established by Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver and Jaap de Wilde. This approach was 
named   “The Copenhagen School”,  and  culminated   in   the  work  “Security: a new framework 
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for analysis”   from   1998  (Williams,   2013,  p.  71).  The   aim   was  to  set  up  a  new framework for 
how to study security, inspired by constructivism, and go beyond the traditional state- and 
military centered approach to security (Buzan et al., 1998, p. 1). 
Securitization 
The securitization theory presented by the CS covers the act of a discursive construction of a 
threat (Williams, 2013 p. 72). In the perspective of international security one talk about 
security when an issue is presented as an existential threat to a referent object being for 
instance the state, the government, territory, society, etc. (Buzan et al., 1998, p. 21). 
Securitization can be seen as politicization taken to the extreme, and refers to an issue as a 
part of the political agenda requiring attention from the government (ibid., p. 23). Addressing 
an issue as a security threat is a securitization move, and in doing so the securitizing actor 
articulates a speech act. To succeed in this move, the securitization actor will try to convince 
an audience that the issue is an existential threat. Applying the speech act one will try to 
legitimize   a  response,  which   go  outside   the  “rules of the game”  (ibid.,   p.  24).  According   to  
the CS one cannot talk about securitization if the speech act fails, and controversial methods 
are not being legitimized by the audience. Opposite when the speech act is successful the 
securitization actor (often the political elite in society) is able to take in controversial methods 
with the acceptance of the population - the securitization has thus succeeded (ibid., p. 25). 
The CS perceives security as a “self-referential practice”  meaning   that   securitization   theory  
does not address whether or not the security issue in fact is an existential threat. It is the 
articulation   of  the   security   issue   as  a  threat   that  makes   it   a  threat.   As  Wæver  puts  it:   “it is the 
utterance itself that is the act”  (Wæver, 1998, p. 45). This entails that the language constructs 
the perception of a reality. However, this study will focus mainly on the securitization move, 
and do not address whether the audience accepts the speech act articulated by the 
securitization actor. Nevertheless, there will be some suggestions that the securitization move 
can be seen as successful, however, no proof is made since we do not address the audience 
but the ones being seen as the existential threat. 
Sectors 
When examine the speech act, one must identify who is the securitizing actor and what 
referent object is threatened. This can be done by using the notion of sectors. The theory 
addresses five sectors, the military-, political-, societal-, environmental- and the economic-, 
all with a different referent object and perception of security (Buzan et al., 1998, pp. 7-8). 
This study engages with two sectors, namely, the societal and the military sector. The 
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purpose of the military sector is to show how refugees and terrorism explicitly are articulated 
as existential threats to the security of the state Kenya by military means. It refers to the 
Somali refugees potentially being al-Shabaab and thereby constitutes a military threat 
towards the state. The societal sector will illustrate how refugees and Somalis more implicit 
are perceived as a threat to a Kenyan we-identity. As the study does not aim at investigating 
how ethnic Somalis are framed as threats to Kenya’s economy or ideological beliefs, the 
economic and political sectors will not be evaluated. Considering the empirical material, the 
environmental sector is not relevant for the aim of the study, and will not be covered. 
The Military Sector 
The military sector reflects the traditional security perception in regards of how it is 
concerned with external and internal military threats. In this sector the sovereign state is 
perceived as the referent object and the ruling elite of the state is identified as the securitizing 
actor (Buzan et al., 1998, pp. 49-55). The elite of the state thus has the opportunity to 
articulate a threat, which challenges the sovereign state in order to legitimize actions to block 
the   threat.  The   external   threat   is   identified   by  the  securitizing   actor’s   perception   of   the  threat.  
This could be in regards of the threatening actor’s  military capabilities, and whether it seems 
willing to use these as means to threaten a state's sovereignty (ibid., pp. 51, 58-59).  
As the focus in this paper is mainly on internal threats, it will be the focal point in the 
following. An internal threat is an actor which challenges the role of the state from within. An 
example of an internal threat is thus would-be states; e.g. autonomous units that seek to 
replace the state (ibid., p. 53). Terrorist-organisations can be perceived as would-be states, as 
they seek to replace the government. Including the military sector will contribute to the 
analysis   of  the  Kenyan   government’s   securitization   of  Somalis   in   Kenya   as  a threat. 
The Societal Sector 
The societal sector enters the picture of security when the identity of large scale groups and 
collective identities are perceived as threatened (Buzan et al., 1998, p. 119). Thus in this 
sector the referent object is large scale identity groups; for instance a nation, a racial, ethnic 
or religious group or tribes (ibid., p. 121). A collective identity should be understood in 
reference   to  Benedict   Anderson's   concept   of  “imagined   communities”,   which   refers   to  an  
identity community as self-constructed through a common idea of this particular community 
(as cited in ibid., p. 120). Constructing something as threatening to identity is a question of 
constructing   it   as  a  threat   to  the   collective   “we”   (ibid.).   Collective   identities   are  dynamic,   and  
thus change naturally over time through the influence of other identities (ibid., p. 119). 
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Whether a security conflict will emerge depends on which self-definition achieves dominance 
in society, and whether the collective identity is close-minded or open-minded (ibid, pp. 23, 
120). For the Kenyan government to construct something as threatening to a we-identity, they 
will have to convince the audience that Kenyans should understand themselves as having one 
identity, threatened by a rival identity of ethnic Somalis. 
Critiques 
The CS has been met with criticisms from different perspectives. In order to take our own 
position relative to the theory one must gain a reflected understanding of CS. The critiques 
we will take into account are presented by Claire Wilkinson, Juha A. Vuori and Bill 
McSweeney. 
Fixed Identity? 
One  of  the   leading   critics   of  the  CS’s  understanding   of  identity   is  presented   by  Bill  
McSweeney. In his opinion the CS uses identity in a deterministic manner claiming that 
someone cannot speak on behalf of the society (McSweeney, 1996, p. 83). He argues that 
identities are not external variables that can be labelled a population in society, but that they 
are evolving and changing constantly (ibid., p. 86). Therefore, he argues, it is not labelling 
identity that is important but the processes of identity formation. He argues that if the CS was 
truly constructivist and concerned with the construction of a threat, they would not consider 
society as one unity consisting of a group of individuals with a shared identity (ibid.). To this 
critique, the CS has replied that they do perceive identity as being constructed by people and 
groups through different processes (Buzan & Wæver, 1997, p. 243). However, the CS argues 
that a constructed identity can become socially embedded and thus an object for security 
concerns. This is due to their purpose for analysis - namely   to  “study the politics around the 
established identity”  (ibid.).   The  CS  then   accepts  identity   formation   as  a  process  that   can  be  
studied in endlessness, but if one do not give an account for a given identity it will not be 
possible   to  study   identity   as  a  referent   object.  This   implies   a  rejection   of  McSweeney’s  
critiques   of  being   “near   positivistic”.   Instead,   they   position   themselves   somewhere   in   the  
middle for the purpose of analyzing what is around identity (ibid.).  
An Eurocentric Point of Departure? 
Another critique claims that the CS is subjected to a Westphalian Straitjacket (Wilkinson, 
2007, p. 5). This is a term, which describes a Western perception of the international system 
as universal (ibid., p. 7). It implies that state and society shall be understood from a Euro-
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American point of view, and therefore have a normative element (ibid.). Hence, Wilkinson is 
questioning the CS to be used elsewhere than Europe and North America.  
One of the issues Wilkinson addresses is the notion of identity, which she claims to be 
European (ibid., p. 10). According to Wilkinson, CS defines identity as linked to the state. 
The  population   of   a  state  will   often   be  “bearers”   of   the  same  nationhood, and the idea of a 
common identity will be related to the concept of a nation-state (ibid.). She argues that the 
perception of society and identity potentially lead to a societal sector, which is less adaptable 
to identity groups who cannot be categorized in line with the Western understanding of 
nation-state. This might be the case in many non-Western countries where identity groups 
defined by ethnicity and association with tribes do not operate in parallel to the state (ibid., 
p.11). Another critique of the Westphalian straitjacket is the importance put in the speech act 
as a means of expression. Freedom of speech might be practiced in many Western countries, 
but in many non-Western countries people may not have the ability to raise their voice on 
political issues. Therefore, she argues, more focus should be put on other forms of 
expressions e.g. protest actions (ibid., p. 12). Further, she criticizes how it too narrowly 
focuses on the linearity between the speech act and the outcome in order to call it 
securitization. She suggests that the theory should be more focused on the process, and how 
there is an interrelation between the securitizing actor, the referent object, and the threat 
narrative,   as  they   in  many   cases  have   shown   to  be  “mutually   reinforcing”   (ibid.,   p.  21).  The  
critique are thus relevant to elaborate on since we are applying the CS on Kenya being out of 
Europe, however, this will be responded   to  in   “Our  Position”. 
Five Strands of Securitization 
Vuori has addressed the validity of the CS outside a Western context (Vuori, 2008).  
According to him, the CS focuses too narrowly on “moving  issues  beyond  the  democratic  
process  of  government” (ibid., p. 69). He argues that also non-democratic states face security 
issues, and have to legitimize their actions in order to get support from the public. Even if a 
society is not build on democratic values, every society has some rules and norms (ibid.). 
Hence, security issues are not only important in a Western context, but the way the issues are 
addressed politically varies in different countries. Thus, it is important to study security in 
many contexts to gain a concise understanding of securitization, as it will increase the 
applicability of the concept outside Western democracies (ibid., p. 68). 
Vuori suggests a way of refining the concept in order to apply it outside a Western context 
but without distorting the meaning of it (ibid., p. 73). He builds up an argument following the 
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same logic that constitutes languages. As he points out: “all  human  languages  share  a  set  of  
constitutive  rules” (ibid.). These rules precede all languages and cultures. He argues, if 
security issues are constituted through a process of speech acts, they should follow the same 
logic as languages, and thus build on the same mechanisms in all society (ibid.). He 
introduces an illocutionary aspect, encapsulating the performative act of the speaker uttering 
e.g. a wish, a request, or a command, “Illocutionary   speech  acts,  like  securitization,  are  an  
example  of  practices  that  derive  from  these  universal  rules.” (ibid.). Searles and 
Vanderveken (as cited in Vuori, 2008, p. 74) divide the speech act in five different strands 
according to its illocutionary point: 1) assertive (statements, explanations) 2) directives 
(orders, request, and commands) 3) commissives (vows, threats, guarantees) 4) expressives 
(apologies, thanks, congratulations) 5) declarations. Vuori argues that speech acts often 
consist of sequences of several speech acts and thus are very complex (ibid.). A complex 
speech act will usually be divided into three elementary acts: A claim, where the speaker has 
to convince the audience that something is a threat; warning, where the speaker has to 
convince the audience that the threat is realized if something is not being done. The third act 
varies and depends on the illocutionary force; it could be a recommendation, suggestion, 
request, or an explanation. 
He points out that the form of the illocutionary force defines the speech act. Hence, in 
securitization a difference in the illocutionary points will lead to a difference in the strand of 
securitization (ibid., p. 75). However, the intentional illocutionary speech act is not enough to 
decide whether the speech act is a success as it depends on the audience. As this study 
focuses on the securitization move it will not go into details about whether or not the 
securitization is successful. By including the illocutionary logic it becomes clear that 
Wæver’s   securitization   is   only   one  strand  of   securitization   (legitimizing   future   acts), as it is 
derived from one illocutionary point. Vuori argues that there are five different strands derived 
from the logic of illocutionary division. The first strand is securitization for raising an issue 
on the agenda. The securitizing actors will have to be in a position where (s)he is able to raise 
an issue on the agenda e.g. scholars, politicians, or journalists, and the audience could be 
decision-makers. The securitizing actor will aim to convince decision-makers that they 
should act on the threat (ibid., p. 77). The second strand is Securitizing for legitimizing future 
acts. This strand is the classical CS presented by Wæver (1998). The securitizing actors in 
this strand are politically responsible decision-makers, and the audience (voters, journalist 
etc.) are evaluators of the legitimacy of the action. The aim is to justify a future action that 
otherwise would be illegitimate (ibid., p. 80). The third strand is Securitization for 
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deterrence. The securitizing actor is someone in a position to invoke authority, and the ones 
being securitized are also the audience. Hence the securitization is aimed at the threat itself, 
and the aim is to deter the threat without having to make use special politics (ibid., p. 81). 
The fourth strand is securitization for Legitimizing past acts. In this strand the securitizing 
actor can for instance be a political decision-maker, and the audience is the evaluators of the 
legitimacy of the speech act. The aim is to legitimize actions that have already been done, and 
thus justify actions, which have been perceived as illegitimate (ibid., p. 85).  
The strand can also be used for reproducing already existing security structures. The fifth 
strand is Securitization for control. The securitizing actor in this strand is someone in a 
formal position, and the audience is those under the leadership, e.g. members of a party.  The 
aim of this strand is to, “get  the  audience  to  do  the  acts  required  by  the  actor  or  to  forbid  
them  from  doing  certain  acts.” (ibid., p. 88). This division allows one to use the concept of 
securitization in contexts where the speech act may take another form than the one presented 
in   the  CS’s  theory   of  securitization.   In  the   analysis   of  speech   acts  by  Kenyan  MP’s,  Vuori’s  
five strands will be used as an analytical tool for identifying the speech act performed in the 
securitization of ethnic Somalis. 
Our position 
In relation to the critique set up by McSweeney we have taken into consideration whether or 
not  to  accepts  the  CS’s  argument   of   being   constructivist, even though, they do not focus on 
the identity process. In a country like Kenya consisting of many different tribes and 
ethnicities, it can be difficult to talk about one unified nation as in many Western societies, 
where the state equalizes the diversity of the nation. However, as the CS states in its response 
to McSweeney, identity is constructed but can still be an object of security concerns. If the 
government, as the securitizing actor, invokes some kind of we-identity with the Kenyans, 
Kenyan identity will potentially become a referent object in the specific situation. 
McSweeney claims that the CS lack a constructivist point of departure since, in his words, the 
identity   becomes   a  “near positivistic”  object  within   the  CS.  We  must   justify   CS’s  idea  of 
using   identity   as  a  referent   object.  Therefore   a  potential   “fixed”   identity   articulated   within   a  
speech act as being the referent object is constructed by the securitizing actor. It is thus the 
articulation of identity as being a referent object, and the threat posted to this that we aim to 
study.   The   “fixed”   identity   is  then   constructed   through   the   speech   act,  and  makes   it   possible  
to study the politics around the identity.  
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Another critique of CS, which is included in our perception of our own positioning, is the 
assumption that the CS departs from a Eurocentric idea of identity and thus their analytical 
use of it. The critique is relevant as it applies the securitization theory in a non-Western 
country.  However, the theory of securitization is still useful in our case, as we identify 
speech acts, in our aim to show that the government in Kenya tries to legitimize actions out of 
normal political procedure amongst the Kenyan population. The study embrace the critique 
by Vuori since he elaborates on the idea that all societies (democracy or not) have rules. 
Furthermore that all social institutions must contain a degree of legitimacy in order to exist. 
Thus the study includes the different strands of speech act as another perspective on how to 
analyze securitization processes. These strands will be used as an analytical tool in the paper, 
and thus make the concept of securitization more applicable for Kenya. 
Methods and Methodology 
Two distinct methodological approaches are included in this study in order to embrace the 
assumption derived from the problem statement. The first methodological approach departs 
from constructivism, including the qualitative method of process tracing. This method 
addresses  the   analysis,   “Constructing a Narrative of Alienation”  which   aims to illustrate how 
the Kenyan government uses narratives in constructing a certain language concerning 
countering terrorism. The second methodological approach departs from a phenomenological 
point making use of Grounded Theory. This methodology is included, since the primary 
empirical   data  of  the   analysis,   “Perceptions of Security in Eastleigh”  is   based  on  semi 
structured interviews. Grounded Theory allows the study to be inspired of the material. 
Furthermore, it isolates new understandings of political and cultural security in order to 
reflect on the life world of the informants. 
The   following   section   of   “Methods and Methodology”   aims   to  elaborate   on  the   approaches  
briefly named, and for what purpose they are included. The section will furthermore illustrate 
how they supply each other. 
The following model aims to provide an overview of the structure of this study: 
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Methods   of  “Constructing   a  Narrative   of  Alienation” 
The   analysis,   “Constructing a Narrative of Alienation”   intends   to  examine   how  conflicts  
between Kenya(ns) and Somalis in Kenya historically, measured as descriptive inferences, 
have been influencing an alienating narrative of Somalis living in Kenya. This narrative is 
specifically associated with threats and insecurity and is analyzed in the form of a 
securitization move. It is argued that contemporary clashes of interests between these ethnic 
groups, is used by the Kenyan government to discursively construct a narrative of Somalis 
living in Kenya. The existence of the narrative is thus the focal point of this study, which it 
aims to argue and discuss throughout the study. This analysis is related to a constructivist 
paradigm, partly, because the theory included situates itself within constructivism. Further, 
because the methodological approach is chosen as a means to analyze how reality is 
constructed. 
Inspired by Constructivism  
This study relates to constructivism as theory of science, as it aims to propose that the 
discourse, created by the Kenyan government, is not the sole and only true reality. Initially, 
this idea was developed as, especially, human rights organizations argued that Somali 
refugees faced violation of their rights in Kenya (Ghoshal, et al., 2013; Simpson & Laper, 
2013). The study thus assumes that these violations have consequences for Somalis living in 
Kenya. However, the study acknowledges that neither assumption’s will reflect a sole true 
reality. This is why the study does not seek to generalize on behalf of the analysis, but rather 
contribute to a more reflected understanding of the problem area by putting forth contesting 
arguments (Pedersen, 2012, p. 188). 
 
The study seeks to accommodate constructivism by different means. First of all it includes a 
broadened perception of e.g. security cf. the Copenhagen School. Furthermore, the idea of the 
speech act from securitization theory is broadened, by including the arguments of Vuori, to 
accommodate an understanding that the speech act is not fixed but takes place in different 
contexts. The study acknowledges that reality is individual, subjective, and negotiable. In 
practice, it thus seeks to investigate different realities for respectively the Kenyan 
government and ethnic Somalis living in Kenya as two distinct groups. In this 
acknowledgement lays also the perception that there are further different realities for 
individuals in subgroups, of the two distinct groups, which is essential in the analysis 
“Perceptions of Security in Eastleigh”.  In this regard, it is acknowledged that one cannot limit 
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oneself from including presumptions, but seek to stay as reflected and transparent as possible 
throughout the development of the study. 
Combining Process Tracing, Securitization Theory and Speech Act 
Analysis 
The   first   coming   analysis,   “Constructing a Narrative of Alienation”  aim   to  contextualize   why  
the reality of the government, in relation to the narrative, has been constructed as it is. The 
analysis puts forward history- and theoretically grounded arguments illustrating how this 
discourse is created and sustained. Methods of this analysis are inspired by process tracing 
and include speech act analysis. The latter will contribute to a more theoretically grounded 
analysis. 
Process Tracing 
Process tracing is an analytical tool which can be used for, “describing  political   and  social  
phenomena  and  for  evaluating  causal  claims” (Collier, 2011, p. 823). To do so, descriptive 
and causal inferences are included. Descriptive inferences are means to a careful description 
of a series of events, leading up to the actual causality, which is explored (ibid., p. 824). As 
Collier states: “To  characterize  a  process, we must be able to characterize key steps in the 
process” (ibid.).   For  this   study  descriptive   inferences   are  indicators   identified   as  “key steps”  
prior to the first analysis, through a hermeneutic process-understanding, encapsulated by 
arguments in academic literature, news reports, field trip experiences, interviews and external 
meetings and through internal discussion (Juul, 2012B, pp. 108-112.). The identified 
descriptive inferences will first of all provide knowledge about a series of events which have 
happened in Kenya. Together the analysis of descriptive inferences will not only give an 
account for history but also contextualize the two following sub-analyses. In the latter two 
variables of descriptive inferences are analyzed as specific speech acts. In practice, the first 
partial of “Constructing  a  Narrative  of  Alienation” will thereby carefully describe indicators 
in   order  to  understand,   how  and  why  Kenya’s   counter-terrorism policies can be perceived as 
a move toward constructing an alienating narrative and securitizing ethnic Somalis.  
Choice of Empirical Material 
The analysis intends to propose, how a series of events between Kenya(ns) and Somalis in 
Kenya historically have been influencing this narrative. Therefore the empirical material and 
literature chosen for this first part of the analysis shall be able to provide careful description 
of the events of descriptive inferences. Thus, the literature and material that contributed to 
identify the descriptive inferences are included in the analysis thereof. The descriptive 
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analysis therefore accounts, not only for history but also analyses, of mostly peer-reviewed 
scholars within the field. 
Method of Speech Acts Analyses 
The descriptive analysis of a series of events is followed by two speech act analyses. These 
two are also included as descriptive inferences. They seek further to investigate in depth, how 
statements by government officials contribute to the construction of the specific discourse 
and narrative of interest. The cases are chosen as they represent and articulate specific 
contemporary clashes between the two groups. Further, they support the aim of the problem 
statement by including cases of anti-terror operations in Eastleigh. The aim of the speech act 
analyses are thus to investigate, if and how, an alienating narrative takes place. The two 
speech act analyses follow the methodological approach of a theoretical scheme set up by 
Vuori (Vuori, 2008, p. 76). The scheme includes a broadening   of  the  Copenhagen   School’s  
notion of the speech act, even though the analyses still situate within the original 
securitization framework by the Copenhagen School. 
Purpose of Causal Inference in Process Tracing 
The   analysis   “Constructing a Narrative of Alienation”  has  thus   explored   and  explained   a  
series of events that leads up to the causal assumption of the problem statement. In the 
formulation of the problem statement one can identify an assumption of causality between the 
Kenyan   government’s   anti-terror operations, understood through securitization theory, and its 
impacts on political and cultural security of local ethnic Somalis. The descriptive inferences 
are thus the basis for arguing of a securitization move, which is the causal inference. Through 
securitization theory, the study identifies a securitization move by the Kenyan government, as 
it carries out anti-terror operations. To analyze, whether this securitization move has a local 
impact on ethnic Somalis in Eastleigh, the notions of political and cultural security are 
identified as means to measure this exact assumption of causality. This assumption is written 
forth in an explorative process, from the first to the second analysis. 
Methods   of  “Perceptions  of  Security   in  Eastleigh” 
This paragraph aims to clarify the methodological approach of “Perceptions  of  Security  in  
Eastleigh”. During the process of collecting empirical material we went to Nairobi, Kenya, in 
order to investigate how speech acts, operations and initiatives in regard of anti-terrorism, 
affects the local level. When conducting our research in the field, we were interested in 
exploring the life world of ethnic Somalis living in Eastleigh. Throughout this paragraph one 
will touch upon the point of departure of entering the field and the selection of informants. 
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There will be an elaboration according to two concepts, cultural and political security, and 
how they will be treated in this study with an inspiration of Grounded Theory. Furthermore, 
one will give an account for the structure of the analysis, and how the process of open coding 
has influenced the structure and choice of themes. 
Field trip and Preconceived Knowledge 
When conducting our research in the field, we were interested in exploring the life world of 
ethnic Somalis living in Eastleigh. The material was gathered through a phenomenological 
approach, thus from the perspective that realization is built on a valid foundation when based 
on actual experience, rather than preconceived knowledge such as theory (Juul, 2012A, p. 
71). The aim was to keep an open-minded approach, thus conducting interviews while 
focusing on how ethnic Somalis interpreted and experienced living in Eastleigh (ibid., p. 99).  
In order to focus our research when conducting the interviews, two concepts were adopted; 
political and cultural security. Political security defined as: “freedom  from  dictatorship  and  
other arbitrary  government”, and cultural security defined as “freedom  from  ethnic  or  
religious denomination"  (Gleditsch, 2013, p. 178). We selected the concepts in order to create 
analytical tools for categorizing our empirical material, and as an instrument to prepare our 
interview guide in accordance to the knowledge we were in pursuit of. 
Political and Cultural Security 
Political and cultural security was adopted in order to conceptualize the identified 
consequences   of  the  Kenyan   government’s   anti-terror initiatives towards the Somali 
community in Eastleigh. They were found relevant in the above mentioned definition by 
Gleditsch (2013). He is further inspired by Gurr and Jaggers (1995). However, political 
security includes democratic governance and respect for human rights (Gleditsch, 2013, p. 
178). The concept can thus be understood as the guarantee of civil liberties to all citizens, and 
in relation to political participation, respect of rule of law, equality, and inclusiveness etc. 
(Heywood, 2014A, p. 129; Jaggers & Gurr, 1995, p. 471). Political security is thus an 
indicator   of  the   informants’   place   in   society   and  their   role   as  citizens/non-citizens in Kenya. 
Cultural security, on the other hand, responds to religion and ethnicity. An ethnic group is 
referred to as  a  group:   “sharing a distinctive and enduring collective identity based on 
common descent, shared experience and cultural trails” (Gurr, 2000, p. 4). Measurements for 
cultural   insecurity   would   be  to  explore   how  ethnic   Somalis’   identity might be targeted in 
relation to religion and ethnicity. This includes any negative treatment relating to ethnicity or 
religion from government, police, or population. 
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Reperceiving Political and Cultural Security - Inspired by Grounded Theory 
Entering the field we were aware of our presumptions of the concepts. We found it necessary 
to allow new perspectives to arise during the interview situation, to contextualize the 
concepts of cultural and political security in accordance to the informants.  
The open minded approach entails, that the informants can speak about their life as they 
perceive it, and new understandings of political and cultural security will thus emerge from 
the informant’s narratives. The necessity for evaluating our pre-perception of the two 
concepts, in relation to the life worlds of the informants, is due to the fact that the concepts 
bear a mark of a Western understanding of democratic governance. In order to reduce the 
notion that political security entails solely patterns of ideal Western democracies, one must 
let the empirical data decide, what political and cultural security consist of. The process of 
formatting new understandings of the concepts is inspired by the methodological approach, 
Grounded Theory. The method is taken into account in order not to impose the concepts on 
the empirical data, but allow the empirical material to lead the analysis. Basically, it is a 
qualitative scientific method where the researcher is able to discover theory on the basis of 
empirical material (Boolsen, 2010, p. 207). In this case the study is inspired by this approach, 
since it will not contribute with a new theoretical understanding of the concepts. Rather 
Grounded Theory is applied in order to let the empirical data shape the concept. 
  
The process of re-perceiving political and cultural security varies between deduction and 
induction. This entails that the empirical data influences pre-perceived theoretical 
assumptions (ibid., pp. 207-208). Shaping interplay between the concepts and the empirical 
material enable us to fill out the meaning of the concepts anew. Inspired by Grounded 
Theory,   this   method   is   used  from   the  perspective,   that   the   concepts  will   represent   “the   real  
world”   more   likely   through the empirical data (ibid., p. 208). Thus, the aim of this study is to 
explore security from an individual perspective through empirical data gathered in Kenya. 
Conducting Interviews 
A semi-structured interview guide structured the interviews, dividing questions into research- 
and interview questions. The research questions depart from the notions of political and 
cultural security, to make sure that the concepts would be elaborated on during the interview. 
As our approach to the interviews was more inductive, the interview guide aimed to create a 
space for the informants to direct the interview. Thus, in accordance to the phenomenological 
approach we strived to be open towards a potential diversity and unpredictability in the 
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interview situation (Juul, 2012A, p. 100). As one narrative illustrated, business, as an 
embedded  part  of  Eastleigh’s   culture,   was  essential   to  the   informant understands of culture, 
but it was not a part of our pre-understanding of cultural security. By letting the informant 
elaborate his view, we opened up for a broader, and more reflected, perception of cultural 
security. Thus, as illustrated in the interview guide2, the research questions were not asked in 
the interview. Instead different questions relating to the research question, including the 
concepts was our guideline throughout the interview. 
Collecting Empirical Material in Eastleigh 
The interviews, which constitute the empirical base for the analysis “Perceptions  of  Security  
in  Eastleigh”, was conducted during a 12 days field trip in Nairobi, Kenya. Before leaving 
Denmark we established as many contacts in Nairobi as possible, recognizing that it was 
difficult to arrange meetings from home. We  arranged   a  meeting   with   our  “fixer”   and  
interpreter, Elias, who is a young Somali man living in Eastleigh. He was able to set up 
interviews with the Chairman of Nyumba Kumi, Clive Hamoudi, the General Associate of 
Eastleigh Business District, Ahmed Mohamed, and one Somali refugee, Fatima, at Eastleigh 
Community Wellness Centre. Furthermore we had beforehand been in contact with Refugee 
Consortium of Kenya, RCK, and had arranged an interview with Communication, Research 
and Monitoring Officer, Andrew Maina. He was able to put us in contact with some of their 
clients resulting in interviews with three Somali refugees, Ilhan Ahmed, Sadia Adia, and 
Ahmed   Omar,   at  RCK’s  office   in  Buruburu,   Nairobi.   Thus,   including   Habib  Alfaruk   from   the  
Somali Student Association, we ended up conducting six interviews with ethnic Somalis, and 
the Chairman of Nyumba Kumi3, who all lived in Eastleigh. Furthermore, we were in contact 
with the Somali Student Association at Nairobi University, with whom we arranged a focus 
group interview. The initial idea was to have them discuss topics, that we had decided on and 
prepared from home, but the interview turned out differently from what we had expected, and 
became more of an exchange of their stories related to different issues. Retrospectively, a 
smaller number of informants might have been more constructive for the setting and purpose. 
In addition to this, we might not have been clear enough with the students, what our aim was 
with a focus group interview. However, their stories gave us a great insight to their 
perceptions of everyday life in Eastleigh. In addition to the structured interviews with local 
Somalis we had initial meetings with a PhD student at Roskilde University, Kirstine 
                                                 
2 Appendix, Interview Guide, Ethnic Somalis  
3 Nyumba  Kumi   covers  the  government’s  initiative   to  create  security  networks  in  small   communities  
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Varming, and Anthropologist, Martine Zeuthen to gain background knowledge, discuss the 
issues we were interested in, and reflect on methodological considerations. 
Selecting Informants 
As the study aim to address the assumption, that ethnic Somalis are affected by the Kenyan 
government’s   anti-terror strategies, we sought to get in contact with Somalis, who were likely 
to have different perceptions than the government of security in Eastleigh. This we aimed to 
capture by interviewing people with different social backgrounds and thus different 
perspectives to talk from. Hence, we arranged interviews with a businessman, who is a 
Kenyan Somali, refugees living in Kenya on a UN mandate but residents in Eastleigh, and 
Somali students who came to Kenya as refugees. We found it important to explore the life 
worlds, of not only refugees, but ethnic Somalis in general, including Kenyan Somalis.  
 
The   refugees   we  interviewed   in   Buruburu   and  Eastleigh’s   Community   Wellness   Centre  did  
not speak English, and therefore it was necessary to make use of an interpreter during the 
interviews. Due to the circumstances surrounding the field, we had to use interpreters who 
worked at Refugee Consortium of Kenya and the Community Wellness Centre. Using a staff 
member as interpreter meant, that we have to be aware of certain issue afterwards. For 
instance, the interpreter might, deliberate or not, have presented a specific angle on the issue. 
In Buruburu, the interpreter Ahmed Omar was himself a Somali refugee now working at 
RCK.  Potentially,   that   could   make  him   biased  when   interpreting   the  refugees’   narratives.  
However, it was also strength when establishing a confidential relation to the informants, as 
they already seemed confident with Omar. Whereas the interpreter in Buruburu might have 
helped build a confident relation to the informants, using an interpreter at the Community 
Wellness Centre might have let to more complications. As the informant often looked at the 
interpreter, it was difficult to get eye contact. Thus, the interpreter might also have been a 
barrier in building trust to the respondent. Contrary, the interpreter was essential for making 
the interview due to the circumstances, and without having her interpreting we would not be 
able to have any conversation with the informant. 
Ethics 
Bringing up anti-terrorism initiatives and security as topics for debate, may be sensitive, 
especially, if one have had first-hand experiences with the consequences of such. Thus, we 
made sure that the informants were aware of the purpose of our study. We further made sure 
that all participation was voluntarily, as we considered reliability towards the informants 
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important. Several of the informants were clearly upset, and during some of the interviews, 
we ensured, it was okay for them to disrupt the interview, if they did not feel comfortable 
with proceeding. Taking the settings in Buruburu into consideration, it was especially 
important to stress that we did not have authority to help the informants in their refugee case. 
It became necessary as one woman believed talking to us was in favor of the process, 
deliberately showing us her UN mandate and giving us her number. Some of the refugees 
wished to stay anonymous and would not have the interviews recorded. This was the case 
with Fatima at the Community Wellness Centre, and the students from Nairobi University, 
why we changed their names and did not record the interviews. 
Structuring the Analysis 
The   analysis,   “Perceptions of Security in Eastleigh”   is   structured   by  six   themes   selected  with  
inspiration from Grounded Theory. Initially, the empirical material was processed through 
open coding. Thus, an inductive approach was applied in order to find patterns and 
regularities, which enabled us to find the main concerns narrated in the empirical material 
(Boolsen, 2010 p. 212). Identifying main concerns generated new themes based on re-
interpreted perceptions of political and cultural security through the material. Themes derived 
from the interviews were as follow: Eastleigh, Police, Usalama Watch, Kenyan Population, 
ID Cards and Political System. Thus, the second analysis is structured according to themes 
generated from the material. 
To summarize the methodological approach used in the analysis, “Perceptions  of  Security  in  
Eastleigh” it departs from a phenomenological point of view, inspired by Grounded Theory. 
It aims to capture the informant’s presumptions of, on beforehand, identified themes in order 
to put their life world into cultural and political security.  
Combining Methodologies of Two Analyses 
As the initial steps of this study developed and limited the problem area, it became clearer 
how it aimed to investigate, how the Kenyan government's anti-terror strategies affected the 
local Somali community in Eastleigh. The choice of securitization theory was ideal as it, in 
its original form, seeks to show how security is more than the threat of warfare between two 
states. Securitization theory paved the way for investigating the articulation of an ethnic 
group as a threat. However, securitization theory limits itself from elaborating the perspective 
of the perceived threat. As the study began to identify a securitization move, it became 
evident that it ought to be contextualized to bring forward a broader reflection. Thus, 
reasoning the securitization move and its immediate consequences for the actors perceived as 
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threats. Our inspiration from process tracing then reflects the development in the analysis, 
”Constructing a Narrative of Alienation”   toward   the  causal   inferences.   Causal inferences 
represent the specific consequences of the anti-terror strategies that this study aims to 
investigate. As literature in this field have emphasized, immediate consequences especially 
target   local   Somalis’   human   rights,   inclusiveness,   civil   liberties   in   relation   to  political  
representation, religion and ethnicity etc. These identified consequences were summarized as 
concepts of cultural and political security. However, as the study still aimed to investigate the 
consequential impact on the articulated threat, it went to meet those who it argued was 
articulated as a threat by the government: the ones who it argues are affected by anti-terror 
strategies in their everyday life. The two concepts were adopted before entering the field and 
identified throughout a deductive inspired approach since securitization theory were a part of 
localizing the concepts. However, as the study seeks to work in a constructivist manner, it 
acknowledged the need to challenge the concepts. Thus a more phenomenological approach 
was adopted where the informants were able to situate their personal narratives. Nevertheless, 
since the notions of political and cultural security were taken to the field they had an 
influence on the empirical material. The inspiration from Grounded Theory then contributes 
with new understandings of political and cultural security. Thus the two concepts took a 
deductive point of departure, and were afterwards applied in an inductive method in the 
section   “Perceptions   of  Security   in  Eastleigh”.   Political   and  cultural   security   thus   can  be seen 
as recurring throughout the study and are able to connect the more deductive analysis with 
the inductive analysis.  
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Constructing a Narrative of Alienation 
This section will put forward the argument that over time an alienating narrative of Somalis 
in Kenya has been constructed, which today is mostly articulated as the association to al-
Shabaab. However, tensions between Kenyans and Somalis living in Kenya did not start with 
al-Shabaab. The following analysis is constituted of three paragraphs, and will begin with a 
descriptive, historical-founded analysis of how military- and armed conflicts, refugee influx 
and differentiated ID documents have influenced the relationship between Kenyans and 
Somalis in Kenya. The chain of historical events and arguments, lead up to two speech act 
analyses. They build   on  the   theoretical   framework   of  Copenhagen   School’s   theory   (CS),  
Securitization, though adjusted in accordance to Vuori cf. “Five   Strands  of  Securitization”. 
A History of Conflicts 
In 1963, Kenya received independence after having been under rule of the British Empire 
since 1920. Independence meant the beginning of a new state-building process in which the 
first Kenyan government, led by Jomo Kenyatta, urged to establish political and national 
unity in the country (Whittaker, 2008, p. 1). However, reaching independence did not come 
around quietly. Due to the colonial division of the East African territory, the borderlines were 
drawn with little regard to clans, ethnicities and people, resulting in several conflicts over 
territories and resources in the region (Ringquist, 2011, p. 102). 
The area, today known as the Northeastern Kenya or the former Northern Frontier District 
(NFD), was inhabited primarily by ethnic Somalis who demanded secession to join Somalia. 
However, already a year before independence, President Kenyatta insisted that the fate of this 
part of the country was a national affair, and told the ethnic Somalis to, ”Pack your camels 
and go to Somalia”   (Branch,   2014,  p.  642).  The   lack  of  cooperation   on  this   matter   resulted   in  
a civil war shortly after Kenya gained independence, and consequently it suppressed the ideal 
image of a cohesive Kenya.  
 
However, the people of the NFD still appealed for the acknowledgement of their right to 
autonomy and unity with Somalia since the majority was Kenyan Somalis who felt separated 
from their Somali nation and people (Whittaker, 2008, p. 1). They also rejected a common 
identity with the non-Somalis in Kenya as they defined themselves as somewhat superior to 
Kenyans. At last, Somalis wished to be acknowledged as radically different from Kenyans, 
and  demanded   to  be  classified   as  “Asian”,   according   to  the   tax  law system, even though this 
meant higher tax rates (Ringquist, 2011, p. 103). Prior to independence, in 1963, it was 
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announced   that   the  district   should   remain   part  of  Kenya’s   regional   constitution   even   though  
87% of the persons of the NFD had expressed an aspiration of independence from Kenya 
(Whittaker, 2008, p. 8). These distinctive agendas between the new Kenyan government and 
the Kenyan Somalis of NFD, who were represented through the Northern Province 
Progressive   People’s  Party   (NPPPP),  resulted   in   civil war from 1963-1968. 
 
The military wing of the party, Northern Frontier District Liberation Army (NFDLA), 
received external support from the government in Somalia, and took up arms in the battle for 
a  “Greater   Somalia”.   Countering   NFDLA  was  found   to  be  of great importance for the 
Kenyan government in order to establish a strong political state. Thus, the war was given the 
name   “Shifta   War”.  The  word  “Shifta”   means   bandit in Kiswahili, and refers to an 
understanding of criminal activities such as robbery, kidnapping and extortion (ibid., p. 6). 
The word thus describes persons who aggravate trouble and is used in reference to armed 
groups   who  raid   “here   and  there”.   Shifta   was  used  to  describe   activities   of  the  NFDLA,  and  
thereby it became a war against bandits, characterized by illegitimacy and criminality on one 
side,   and  the  Kenyan   state   on  the  other   side   (ibid.,   p.  7).  Labelling   NFDLA  a  “bandit”   threat  
also became a means of delegitimizing the secessionist agenda advocated by the NFD. 
Hence, the Kenyan government discursively turned the war into a nationalist civil-military 
conflict (Ringquist, 2011, p. 117). As Somalia and Kenya re-established their diplomatic 
relationship in 1968, the support from the Somali state to NPPPP and NFDLA ceased, 
leaving no real hope  for   secession.   It  is   argued   that   the  Kenyan   government   used   the  “shifta”-
discourse to justify, not only the far-reaching counterinsurgency measures towards Somalis in 
NFD, but also as a means to target the Somali community in Kenya as a whole: 
 
“Shifta was used as an all-encompassing term to victimize in the widest sense (...). This 
included Somali nomads engaging in traditional pastoral practices that were considered 
economically and culturally damaging.” (Whittaker, 2008, p. 18). 
 
Hence, the conflict was no longer limited to the Northeastern Province but had spread to the 
rest of the country. Consequently, Somali culture was considered damaging for a Kenyan we-
identity and thus a threat in the Kenyan societal sector, cf. CS. However, there are differe nt 
opinions to whether one can talk about a Kenyan nationality. Andrew Maina4, who is a 
                                                 
4 Andrew Maina, appendix, transcript 
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Research and Monitoring Officer at Refugee Consortium, Kenya, argues that, “Kenya  does  
not  have  a  nationality”. In his perception Kenya is just “a  bunch  of  people  with  different 
nationalities  in  one  state”. Nonetheless, by invoking a collective Kenyan identity, it can be 
argued that the government tried to establish a perception of Somali culture as a threat. It is 
not evident from the above-mentioned example whether they succeeded, but it illustrates how 
the   reproduction   of   the  “shifta”-discourse might have been contributing to an attempt to 
securitize Somali culture in the societal sector - as a threat to a Kenyan identity.  
Garissa and Wagalla: the Forgotten Massacres  
The era of post-independence became an era of harsh violence in Northeastern Kenya 
however; the  most   violent   incidents   in  Kenya   took  place   in   the  1980’s  in  Garissa   and  
Wagalla. Today, the massacres are recognized some of the worst human rights crimes in 
Kenya’s   post-independence history (Dahir, 2014).  
From   the  1960’s  onward,   “collective   punishment”   had  been  a  familiar   method   for   the  Kenyan  
government to discipline the population in the Northeastern Kenya (Andersson, 2014, p. 
669). Both the massacres in Garissa and Wagalla are examples of such collective 
punishments, but as a consequence of the large-scale state violence that erupted, these 
incidents were extraordinary, and gained influence on the history writing many years after 
(ibid., p. 661). In Garissa, a conflict between the local society and authorities in 1980 
followed the murder of a District Officer, where the local community offered little help. As a 
consequence, the Provincial Commissioner initiated a retribution by authorities almost 
immediately   after   (ibid.).   While   all   men   in   the   area  were  brought   in   for  ‘screening’,   the  
military stormed through the streets and properties until it was burned to the ground. No 
official number states how many were killed, but hundreds were left dead and many of the 
bodies were gathered by the military and thrown into Tana River (ibid., pp. 661, 162).      
The Wagalla massacre took place in 1984 when the Kenyan military was on a mission to 
Wajir, officially to sort out clan disputes. Close to 5000 men from the Somali clan, Degodia 
was taken to the air base in Wagalla for interrogation, accused of hiding weapons for fighting 
a rival clan (ibid., p. 665). What was supposed to sort out a conflict between two clans, ended 
in the killing of several hundred civilians from Degodia. Several atrocities were committed 
by state military agents, including “torture,  brutal  beatings,  rape  and  sexual  violence,  
burning  of  houses  and  looting  of  property” (ibid.,p. 670).  Exactly how many people suffered 
during the massacre is still unknown as information about the massacre afterwards has been 
very limited. Reports circulating within the Kenyan government revealed details of the 
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massacre, but it were not released for the public until 2007, by the Truth, Justice and 
Reconciliation Commission (ibid., p. 669). Furthermore, all writing about Wagalla was 
banned   in   the  years   after   the  massacre,   showing   the  government’s   attempt   to  turn   down  the  
investigation (ibid., p. 659).  
David Andersson states that in terms of state violence in the North, these events were not 
extraordinary. “It  was  only  the  scale  of  the  killing  at  Wagalla  that  marks  out.” (ibid., p. 660). 
What the massacres in Garissa and Wagalla have in common, is that both cities are 
geographically located in the Northeastern Kenya, and constitutes examples of the 
government's use of collective punishment in the area. According to Andersson, these 
massacres   should   be  seen  in   the  wider   context   of  a  ”forgotten   North”   as  the  Kenyan   state  had  
created a political environment for such things to happen (ibid., p. 659). Thus, he implies that 
a political environment had been established in the Northeastern Kenya where targeting a 
specific community, through military operations, did not happen rarely. Many people have 
been seeking justice for what happened in Garissa and Wagalla, but not until 2014 a 
monument was put up as a memory for the many people who lost their lives. Andersson 
states that even though state violence may finally have been acknowledged in Kenya, it still 
has no real consequences in terms of persecution of the responsibles (ibid., p. 671).  
        
Kenya’s  Global  War  on  Terror  
Terrorism in Kenya is not a new phenomenon, but until 2006, when the Islamic Courts Union 
seized power in Somalia, Kenya had limited counter-terrorism coordination. Hostility to the 
idea of a strong Islamic State in Somalia was partly what led to the Kenyan intervention, 
Linda Nchi, in Somalia in 2011 (cf. problem area). As a direct consequence of the 
intervention, there has been an increasing number of terror attacks in Kenya claimed by the 
Islamist terror organization, al-Shabaab. These attacks have taken place in both the border 
areas and in Nairobi, where especially Eastleigh has suffered several attacks. In Nairobi, 
2013, al-Shabaab carried out an attack on Westgate Mall, where at least 67 were killed. Most 
recently they claimed responsibility for the attack in April 2015, in the city Garissa, where 
among the 147 killed, most of them were Christian students (BBC, 2015 April 3; Franklin, 
2015). These attacks gained significant international attention, both because of the large-
scale-dimension, and because of the many Western civilians killed in Westgate. Also al-
Qaeda has carried out terror attacks in Kenya; in 1998, they claimed responsibility for 
bombing the U.S. embassy, killing 123 people. The international dimension to Kenyan 
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terrorism has thus existed before 9/11, but after Bush proclaimed Global War on Terror, the 
discourse   in   Kenya   seems   to  have   changed   too.  “War  on  terror”   has  recent   years become a 
common   expression   for  Kenya’s   counter-terror strategies which was also evident when 
Former interior minister, Ole Lenku, after the Westgate attack stated that, "We are fighting 
global terrorism here and we have sufficient [intelligence] to suggest  that.”  (Walker, 2013). 
Hence, by articulating the fight against terrorism as a global fight, he situates the attack in 
Kenya in a global terror discourse.  
Subjected to a Target 
Talking about refugee protection in Kenya, one can distinguish between a pre- and a post-
1991  refugee   regime.   Before   1991,  Kenya’s   refugee   protection   was  characterized   as  generous  
and hospitable and with emphasis on local integration. However, this changed in 1991 with 
the large-scale   influx   of  refugees   into   Kenya:   “The numbers (…) jumped from roughly 
12,000, to 120,000 in 1991 and over 400,000 in 1992, and eventually stabilized around 
220,000 by the end of the decade”  (Campbell,   2006,  p.  399).  Especially   the  Somali   protracted  
displacement situation has become a problem for many countries in the region, a problem that 
has been intensified by new crises during the last decades. Since the collapse of the Somali 
Republic   in   the   early   90’s,  Somalia   has  suffered   from   political   instability,   violence   and high 
levels of displacement (Lindley, 2011, pp. 1-6). This is particularly evident in Kenya where 
the   refugee   influx   overwhelmed   the  Kenyan   government’s   refugee   protection   capacity.  
Consequently, they withdrew national authorities from all refugee issues and transferred the 
responsibility to the UNHCR. It has been argued that the suddenly increasing influx of 
refugees   had  the   effect   of:   “growing levels of xenophobia and few opportunities for local 
integration”  (Campbell,   2006,  p.  399).  The   level   of   xenophobia can have been more likely to 
increase as the refugees were already perceived a problem to the Kenyan state. As 
Copenhagen School argues, an issue is more likely to evolve into a societal insecurity if the 
issue is already being perceived a threat in another sector (Buzan et al., 1998, p. 127). In this 
case a sudden, huge influx of refugees was becoming a threat to the Kenyan state, and thus 
spillover effects into the societal sector enabled xenophobic attitudes to grow. 
One key policy definitively changed the possibilities for refugees in Kenya, namely the 
encampment   policy.   This   policy   was  a  result   of  the  Kenyan   government’s   reservation   for  
accepting   new   refugee,   and  entailed   that,   “they all [refugees] must reside in designated 
camps far from the urban centres”  (Campbell,   2006,  p.  399).  Today,   despite   the   encampment  
policy several thousand refugees live permanently as urban refugees in Nairobi. However, as 
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rights-organizations, media-coverage and researchers have documented, many refugees living 
in urban areas are particularly vulnerable to police harassment, arrests, and legal inequalities 
(Simpson & Laper, 2013). They are thus subjected to xenophobic attitudes from their local 
community. 
Differentiated Citizenship 
The huge flows of refugees, political and ethnic tensions between Somalis and Kenyans have 
entailed an institutionalized way of addressing citizenship. Citizenship has been materialized 
and was implemented by the differentiated identification cards (Lochery, 2012, pp. 616, 619). 
It started  in   1989  with   a  “screening   procedure”   where   all   ethnic   Somalis   of  age,  by  law  
should carry an ID specified for this group (HRW, 1990, p. 1). The Kenyan government 
called for a screening in order to separate illegal aliens from the Kenyan citizens (Lochery, 
2012, p. 625). The Kenyan Somalis were required to answer questions according to their 
main clan; detailed geographical explanation of birthplace and language. Also their 
knowledge in Kiswahili and the history of Kenya was taken into account. If they succeeded, 
they were given a pink ID-card which was different from the one carried by ethnic Kenyans 
(ibid., p. 629). Many Somalis were rejected ID and deported back to Somalia, and 
consequently, a huge number of Somalis hid within the Somali-communities in Kenya (ibid., 
632). To avoid Somalis from staying away from registration, the officials asked for police 
assistance who took violent methods into force (ibid., p. 232). 
 
The ID policy was met with criticism from the Somali community. It was claimed that the 
screening would create an antagonistic relation between ethnic Somalis and Kenyans, and 
ultimately   causing   “incalculable psychological damage”  (Lochery, 2012, pp. 630-631). The 
screening of 1989 exemplifies how the Kenyan government constructed citizenship in Kenya 
by negotiating and using language in a specific way, in order to make a clear distinction 
(ibid., p. 616). The issuing of a special pink ID card for Somalis was condemned 
unconstitutional and removed. However, claims of discrimination against Somalis concerning 
the issuing of registration documents are still relevant today. In 2007 the Kenya National 
Commission on Human Rights published a report stating that discrimination on issues of 
identity cards were present, and “particularly   [towards]  those  of  Somali  ethnic  origin” 
(KNCHR, 2007, p. vi). That the Kenyan government differentiated citizenship on the basis of 
ethnicity, may be interpreted as if Somali ethnicity was perceived a threat to ethnic Kenyans, 
and framed as a societal issue. The government attempted to construct a Kenyan we-identity, 
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as opposed to a Somali identity. The issue of ID cards is also linked to the security threats of 
terrorism as the ID cards give access to jobs and mobility. Because of the accessibility that 
the ID cards prescribe, it is often highlighted whether terror suspects are in possession of the 
card, and in which case it has been issued. government officials have previously been charged 
and questioned on how terror suspects have gained ID cards and whether the persons issuing 
registration documents have  been   involved   in   the   terror  plotting   (K24TV,  2014;;  “Kenyan  
official”,   2015).  Thus,   the  obtaining   of  an  ID  card  comes  with   a  certain   power  and  legitimacy  
of being Kenyan, and it is therefore necessary to have a well-functioning procedure for 
issuing registration documents. Ole Lenku has previously acknowledged that the issuing of 
ID cards have been too unthorough, resulting in the issuing of documents to persons not 
meeting the requirements. Therefore, the validity of ID cards are being called into question 
and Ole Lenku argues that the government needs to clean up and “to  put  that  right”  (NTV 
Kenya, 2014). In February 2015, the Kenyan government launched a new online 
identification system which the government proclaims will become effective to full extent in 
July 2016. One of the prospects is that the new system will be able to identify potential 
terrorists (Shimoli, 2014). Mwende Gatabaki, the director-general of Kenya Citizens and 
Foreign Nationals Management Service, the agency in charge of the new initiative, explains 
that, “The  idea  is  to  provide  the  country  with  a  national  identity  platform  that  will  be  the  
cornerstone  of  our  security  strategy.” (Mutegi, 2014).  
 
The argument put forth in this section is that an alienating narrative of Somalis in Kenya has 
been constructed due to a series of historical events. The negative discourse which has grown 
over time, may have allowed for events such as the massacres in Garissa and Wagalla to 
happen. Additionally, events like terror attacks carried out by al-Shabaab, and a sudden, huge 
increase in refugee influx may have added to a negative discourse about Somalis. These 
events and the negative discourse can thus be seen as mutually reinforcing, contributing to a 
reproduction of an alienation narrative about Somalis in Kenya. The series of historical 
events becomes significant in order to understand the context in which the two following 
speech acts are situated. It is thus important to understand that these speech acts are partly 
enabled as a consequence of the historical relation between Somalis and Kenyans, and that a 
securitization move cannot fully be understood without an understanding of the broader 
context in which it is situated. The two speech acts are analyzed within the theoretical 
framework of securitization, and build on statements regarding issues of refugees, and 
operation Usalama Watch in Eastleigh.  
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Speech Act Analysis: Securitizing Dadaab Refugee Camp 
On the 2nd of April 2015, Kenya witnessed a fatal terror attack on Garissa University in the 
Northeastern part of Kenya. The attack was carried out by four al-Shabaab members carrying 
arms and executing a total of 147 individuals. The attack was condemned by all Kenyans, 
including the government, and the state was in national grievance because of the excessive 
number of casualties. On the 5th of April, Deputy President, William Ruto, expressed 
condolences and support to the victims and their relatives of the attack (K24TV, 2015). Nine 
days after the attack, Ruto again issued a public statement in which he stressed the demand 
for   the  closing   of   the  Dadaab  refugee   camp  within   three  months.   Ruto’s   rhetoric   was  direct  
and consisted of an ultimatum as he stated that: “We  have  asked  the  UNHCR  to  relocate  the  
refugees  in  three  months,  failure  to  which  we  shall  relocate  them  ourselves.” (Miriri, 2015). 
In this way, Ruto proposes that all refugees in Dadaab camp must be relocated on the other 
side of the Kenyan border, and implicitly referring to a return of all refugees to Somalia. Ruto 
attempts to legitimize this proposition and future action through a speech act sequence. The 
propositional content of the statement was further advocated with reference to  Kenya’s   prior  
generosity   and  openness   to  refugees   the   last   30  years.  As  Ruto   expressed   “thirty years is a 
long time”  (NTV  Kenya,   2015) indicating that the time of the presence of Dadaab refugee 
camp in Kenya has now expired. The statement has been criticized by human rights groups as 
the closing of Dadaab camp may be interpreted as a disregard of international law of 1951 in 
which Kenya is obliged to protect refugees (Kenyan CitizenTV, 2015). It was further 
questioned whether a potential closing of the camp would counter the tripartite agreement of 
2013 between Kenya, Somalia and the UNHCR on how to govern voluntary repatriation of 
Somali refugees living in Kenya. In defense of this accusation, Ruto acknowledges the 
agreement, but clearly stresses that, “We  are  not  saying  anything  new.  All  we  are  saying  is  
that  we  need  to  reduce  the  time  it  is  going  to  take  so  we  can  have  these  people  go  home.” 
(ibid.). In order to further legitimize his proposition Ruto deliberates a warning in the process 
of his speech act. 
Ruto’s   warning   consists   of  a  propositional   content   of  potential   future   terror   attacks  as  the  one  
recently experienced in Garissa. Such a future attack would be devastating and inexcusable 
which supports the legitimacy of taking actions beyond normal political procedures. In this 
regard, Ruto draws a connection between Dadaab and terrorism – refugees and terrorist 
activities. He therefore expresses that the refugee hospitality of Kenya must come to an end, 
“especially  when  it  is  beyond  doubt  that  now  the refugee camps are being used as havens for 
these  terrorists  and  criminals” (NTV Kenya, 2015). Ruto thus presents a warning that the 
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refugee camp is a source of insecurity to Kenya and the Kenyan population, by reason of the 
claim that al-Shabaab terror networks extend and operate within the Dadaab refugee camp. 
William   Ruto’s   speech   act  process  generates   a  request   directed   against   the  UNHCR  to  close  
the camp within 3 months. This request is necessary as the UNHCR would not take this 
action on their own account. The request, as proposed by Ruto, is indisputable and thus has 
some of the characteristics of a demand. As it is articulated as an indisputable request, it puts 
emphasis to the urgency and high-priority of the issue explaining a dichotomy between 
closing Dadaab, presented as the state of security, and the continued existence of Dadaab, 
presented as the state of insecurity through the potential of future terror attacks. This 
dichotomy puts forth a simplification of the situation which can be understood as a means of 
pressuring the UNHCR as it must choose between a state of security or a state of insecurity. 
The dichotomy can further be understood as a tool in the legitimizing process of future action 
through the speech act process. By drawing up only two scenarios for the future of Kenyan 
national security, the government suggests a greater acceptance of actions beyond normal 
procedure as the action of closing Dadaab refugee camp is articulated as the only one of the 
two scenarios which will ensure future national security. In this case, the referent object is 
thus Kenya as a nation and as a sovereign state. A potential future terrorist attack constitutes 
the security threat, articulated as an external threat which has become internal when linking 
‘Somali   refugees’   to  ‘terrorism’.   Ruto   thus   attempts   to  securitize   terrorism   through   the  object  
of Somali refugees and determines this within the military sector as he states that “(…) we 
relocate  the  camp  to  the  other  side  of  the  border” (ibid., 2015). This statement expresses the 
significance of territorial integrity and thus the implication of the sovereignty of the state 
concerning this security threat. Additionally, Ruto draws a parallel between the attack in the 
USA on 9/11 and the attack in Garissa. By making this parallel, he stresses the fatal character 
of the attack to Kenya as a nation, but also implicitly legitimizes the use of actions beyond 
normal procedure as it was done after 9/11 through the discourse of Global War on Terror. 
Ruto states that, “The same way America never became the same after 9/11, Kenya is going 
to be different. It is not going to be business as usual. Kenya is going to change for good after 
Garissa.” (Kenya CitizenTV, 2015). By entering into this GWOT discourse, Ruto gains 
backing in the history of American anti-terror strategies after 9/11 and the imaginaries 
attached to this worldview. 
 
32 
 
Andrew Maina, Assistant Programme Officer at Refugee Consortium of Kenya5 (RCK), does 
not recognize this securitization move as legitimate, and expresses extensive critique of the 
motive behind the future action of closing Dadaab. As a staff member of RCK, he holds great 
insight   in   how   refugees   are  affected   by  the  government’s   counter-terror strategies, and has a 
strong opinion to how the operations are carried out, arguing that the logic of the Kenyan 
government is based on illegitimate assumptions: “The  issue  with  counter-terrorism 
strategies in this country is they are devoid of any form of accurate information about what is 
happening  on  the  ground.”. Maina further states that as a result of this inaccurate 
information, policies and political actions are being composited on unreliable conditions 
which mean that the government abstains from addressing the root causes of terrorism. 
Maina’s   critique   thus   derives   from   the  understanding   that   the  construction   of   refugees   as  a  
terror threat by the government is invalid. He does not acknowledge the idea that terrorism 
necessarily   is   a  threat   from   “foreigners”   which   he  urges   the  government   to  recognize.   The  
government’s   focus   on  foreigners   and  refugees   as  the   security   issue   is,  according   to  Maina,   a  
means of abdicating the legal obligation that the government has to protect the refugees in 
Kenya. He further draws on another factor when addressing the issue of the attempted 
securitization of refugees; ethnicity. He claims that the securitization is not directed at 
refugees as such but rather at an ethnic minority: 
 
“The  official  government  line  is  that  all  refugees  must  go  home.  But  since  I  am  not  a  
government official that means all Somali refugees must go home. As plain as I can be. If you 
noticed, they [the government]  did  not  say  “close  all  refugee  camps”.  They  say  Dadaab  
which  tells  you  that  the  government  thinks  that  Dadaab  is  the  problem,  not  Kakuma”6  
 
Maina, very explicitly, accuses the government of having an ethnic discriminatory agenda 
which is attempted   to  be  hidden   by  mixing   the   categories   of  “refugee”   and   “Somali”.   By  
mixing the two categories the government can confuse the population and thus undermine an 
explicit   articulation   of  the   ethnic   Somalis   as  the  core  target.  Maina’s   core  claim   is   thus   that 
the securitization of refugees as a terrorist threat is actually rather a securitization of Somalis 
established through an opaque mix of categories. 
                                                 
5 Andrew Maina is introduced in the paragraph, Speech-act analysis: securitizing Dadaab refugee Camp. Further 
see Andrew Maina, appendix transcript 
6 Kakuma Refugee Camp is placed in the north western part of Kenya hosting mostly South Sudanese refugees  
(UNHCR Global Appeal Update, 2015) 
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William Ruto uses the speech act to legitimize the future act of closing Dadaab refugee camp, 
explicitly articulating a relation between Somali refugees and terrorism, and thus making a 
securitization move of Somali refugees. Following speech act analysis of an interview with 
former interior minister, Ole Lenku, illustrates how a securitization move can also be used as 
a legitimization for actions that have already taken place.  
Speech Act Analysis: Securitizing Operation Usalama Watch 
Operation Usalama Watch was launched by the Kenyan government in April 2014. The 
operation was both aimed at detecting any terror related activity, and more broadly to reveal 
any behavior outside the law (NTV, 2014). The operation was launched shortly after two 
grenade   attacks  killed   and  injured   several   people   in  Mombasa   and  Nairobi   (“Kenya:   End  
Abusive Round-Ups”,   2014).  The operation was intensively carried out over a short period of 
time, and resulted in the arrestment of more than 4000 people, many of them held at Kasarani 
Stadium   which   for   the  occasion   was  turned   into   a  police   station   (“The   National   Police  
Service   Act”,   2014). Consequently, many Somali refugees were relocated to Dadaab camp or 
sent back to the war-torn  Somalia   (“Kenya:   End  Abusive   Round-Ups”,   2014).   
The  name   “Usalama   Watch”   derives   from   the  kiswahili   word  meaning   “Security   Watch”.  
Naming the operation a security watch contributed to a placement of the operation within a 
security aspect. It indicated that the aim of the operation was to restore security for the 
Kenyans.  According to Andrew Maina from Refugees Consortium, Kenya (RCK)7, the 
government stresses the importance of security as an attempt to gather support from the 
public as “people  feel  that  the  government  is  doing  something  for  their  security  and  therefore  
they  feel  responsible   for  contributing  to  security”.   
According to many human rights organizations and critics of the operation, the Kenyan 
authorities went too far in their urge for security. Especially, the police have been highly 
criticized for using discriminatory tactics, and for harassing an entire community during 
Usalama Watch. Human Rights Watch states that the crackdown is clearly a violation of 
refugees’   human   rights   (“Kenya:   End  Abusive   Round-ups”,   2014).  Turning   Kasarani   stadium  
into a police station was one of the actions that met massive critique. Refugees were held by 
the authorities under poor conditions for several days, and the screening process was “slow  
and  nontransparent” (ibid.).  
                                                 
7 Andrew Maina, appendix, transcript  
34 
 
Because of the subsequent critiques of the means that were put into action, the government 
found it necessary to legitimize their actions during Usalama Watch. Joseph Ole Lenku, 
former interior minister (2013-2014), legitimized operation Usalama Watch in an interview 
broadcasted on the national tv station NTV (2014). As the interview was conducted in the 
aftermath of Usalama Watch, Ole Lenku used the speech act as a securitization for 
legitimizing past acts (cf. “Five   Strands  of  Securitization”).    
In the interview, Lenku claims that   “Eastleigh   is  an  area  of  insecurity” (ibid.). According to 
him, criminality in Eastleigh reached a point when it was time to bring up the operation, “and  
bring  order  to  every  part  of  this  country”  (ibid.). He states that the operation aimed at 
ensuring safety for the Kenyan population as there had been an increasing security concern 
amongst Kenyans. The Kenyan population can thus be identified as referent object, and as he 
is speaking directly to the Kenyan public in the interview, they are also the audience. Since 
Usalama Watch is aimed at eliminating criminality and terror cells within Kenya’s   border,  it  
is posed as an internal threat in the military sector (cf. Copenhagen School). Though the 
government responded to the threat of terrorism as an internal threat in this particular 
operation, terrorism is in many other cases articulated a threat from outside, coming from 
Somalia  (Kiruga, 2015). 
In the interview, Ole Lenku addresses the threat as internal, claiming that Eastleigh has a 
proportionally higher share of criminal activity than other areas in the country. He 
exemplifies this by stating that there has been found chemicals and devices which the 
government   believes   have   the   capacities   to  become   IED’s   (improvised   explosive   devices)  
(NTV, 2014). That Lenku perceives Eastleigh as a problematic area, becomes clear when he 
articulates   insecurity   as  a  part  of  Eastleigh’s   nature and something which is almost embedded 
in its profile (ibid.). He states that all Kenyans are aware of this, and that Eastleigh has 
operated “as  if  it  is  not  a  part  of  Kenya”  (ibid.).   This   is   an  indication   of  Lenku’s   perception  
of Eastleigh as being particularly problematic compared to other troubled areas in Kenya. 
What he expresses as being an existential threat is the criminality and terror activity which he 
assumes is taking place in Eastleigh. However, he states that Usalama Watch is not only 
about eliminating the terror threat. He says that the government and the police are looking for 
anyone who is outside the law at any parameter, thus also refugees not holding the right ID 
card were targeted. In practice, it meant that many refugees, especially Somali refugees, were 
being   sent  to  Dadaab  camp  or  deported  back  to  Somalia   (“Kenya:   End  Abusive   Round-Ups”,  
2014). He argues, however, that this operation was not targeting a community or a religion, 
rather it was aimed at hitting anyone working outside the law (NTV, 2014).  
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According to Andrew Maina, RCK, it is not a coincidence that Eastleigh, and especially 
Somalis living in Eastleigh, were targeted by this operation. He argues that “Of  course  the  
government cannot say out loud that it is the Somali refugees who are the problem. Because 
that  will  bring  issues  of  discrimination”. He states that the government does not have strong 
evidence pointing towards any particular problem with the Somali community, why they will 
have to target their operations at the entire refugee hood. However, according to Maina, “the  
issue  is  not  per  se  refugee  hood.  The  issue  is  the  nationality”. 
As  a  consequence   of  Lenku’s   claim   that  Eastleigh   should   be  an   area  of   insecurity,   he  brings  
forth a warn to the Kenyan population - the audience of the speech act. He addresses the 
audience, saying that“Al-shabaab finds safe-haven in Eastleigh to prepare themselves for 
criminal  activity”  (NTV 2014). This gives him a reason to believe that terror-network extent 
within Eastleigh. The aim was to convince the Kenyan population that the government should 
act in order to repel the threat from al-Shabaab, and to do so, the operation in Eastleigh was 
necessary. Conductive to this act, help from the Kenyan population was needed, in order to 
gather   information   about  suspected  persons.   In   this   regard,   the  “Nyumba   Kumi”,   meaning  
“ten   houses”   in   Kiswahili,   was  introduced   by  the  government   as  a  community   policing  
initiative. The idea was to create security networks in small communities which enabled 
people to observe their neighbors and to “know  everything  and  everyone  around”  (Muraya, 
2013). Being vigilance is, according to Lenku, the first rule in ensuring security. This 
initiative is a way of involving people in their own security, instigating them to actively take 
part in the security operation and gain intelligence on the ground (ibid.). However, not 
everyone is greeting this new initiative welcome. As Andrew Maina argues, Nyumba Kumi is 
“a  way  of  keeping  an  eye  on  the  foreigners.  Founded  in  the  idea that terrorism is committed 
by  foreigners”. Hence, Maina believes that Nyumba Kumi is a way of keeping control with 
refugees, rather than establishing a safe neighborhood.  
The warn put forth by the government is thus aimed at making the population react to the 
threat in order to repel it. But it can also be viewed as a way of legitimizing policies and 
actions carried out by the government. By getting the public to engage in their own safety, 
and  support   the  government’s   course,   they   are  more   likely   to  successfully carry out actions in 
Eastleigh.  
Nonetheless, it is not always enough to legitimize a course before or during the actions. As 
the operation had already taken place when Ole Lenku was being interviewed, the third part 
of the speech act was aimed at explaining and thus legitimizing Usalama Watch. In his 
opinion the operation was necessary in order to “mop  up  criminal  activities  including  
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terrorism  and  bring  sanity  where  sanity  has  not  existed”  (NTV, 2014). He defends the work 
carried out by the police in Eastleigh, by saying that they have approached people in a polite 
way when asking for ID papers. In cases when a window or a door has be (ibid.). Lenku thus 
argues that the aim, to bring security to Eastleigh, is sufficient to justify the means needed.  
Even though Lenku acknowledge that the police might have used extraordinary means in 
some instances, he does not buy in on the premise, put forth by several human rights 
organizations and other critics, that the police was being discriminatory. He clearly rejects the 
accusations of targeting a specific religious or ethnic community (ibid.). He insinuates that a 
critique against the security measures of the operation is only an instrument to distract the 
security machinery, and thus a direct counteract against   Kenya’s   anti-terror programme. A 
critique of Usalama Watch is portrayed as a means of further extending and complicating the 
work against terrorism. Therefore, he turns the critique around aiming it at those criticizing 
the operation, by accusing them for not wanting security in Eastleigh (ibid.). This conflict 
illustrates a strong discrepancy between the motives put forth by the government and the 
persons criticizing it.  
The discrepancy illustrates the complexity of a securitization move. The government 
explicitly articulates terrorism and refugees as the threat towards the Kenyan public. 
However, according to human rights organizations and RCK employee, Andrew Maina, it is 
not comprehensive to talk about terror or refugees as being targeted. In their view, the 
government’s   securitization   move   is  targeting   the  Somali   community   in   particular   even   if   it   is  
not articulated explicitly. 
These analyses show how the speech acts, conducted by William Ruto and Ole Lenku, are 
aimed at legitimizing the use of extraordinary means in the urge of security in Kenya. They 
both explicitly link refugees to terror threats in their speech acts, and thus make a 
securitization move towards refugees. More implicitly, they relate refugees to Somalis, partly 
by only addressing Dadaab refugee camp, and by only targeting their operations towards 
Eastleigh. Furthermore, as Andrew Maina states, the government mix up the categories 
between Somalis and refugees, since articulating Somalis as a threat would bring up issues of 
discrimination. Nonetheless, according to Maina, the securitization move is targeted Somalis, 
and not by definition refugees.  
These two speech act analyses must be seen in the broader historical context as a 
securitization move towards Somalis is only possible because of the alienating narrative 
which has been created through a chain of historical events. Thus, the alienating narrative 
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about Somalis has established negative discourses, fostering an environment where 
securitization moves towards Somalis are more likely to evolve.  
This section will constitute the foundation for exploring how ethnic Somalis are affected by 
the  discourses   established   in   Kenya,   and  the  government’s   securitization   move   towards   ethnic  
Somalis. While this analysis has focused on the government’s   perspective,   next   analysis   will  
focus on the perspective of the Somalis, and thus move from a state level to an individual 
level.  
Perceptions of Security in Eastleigh 
This analysis aims to illustrate how ethnic Somalis, living in Eastleigh, perceive their security 
in different contexts according to anti-terror measures initiated on a political level. Through 
our empirical material this analysis is able to constitute reflections about political and cultural 
security   with   regard   to  the   informants’   narratives,   experiences,   and  articulations.   The   analysis  
consists of five categories: Eastleigh - a Somali Community; The Police in Eastleigh - Abuse 
of Executive Power; Usalama Watch - An (in)security Operation; (Il)legal Aliens; 
Encountering the Kenyan Population and; Political System. The different sections will 
elaborate on different narratives related to the issues of security. 
Eastleigh - a Somali Community  
Eastleigh is an area in the Eastern part of Nairobi which is predominantly inhabited by 
persons of Somali origin. The area has inherent atmospheric characteristics distinctive from 
other parts of  Nairobi,   and  is   often   colloquially   referred   to  as  “Little   Mogadishu”   referring   to  
the Somali capital. Ahmed Mohamed8, who is the Secretary General of Eastleigh Business 
District Association, describes Eastleigh as a “business  hub”  that never sleeps. Mohamed is 
of Somali origin and born in Kenya where all his family lives. According to Mohamed, 
Eastleigh is a “very  diverse,  cosmopolitan  area” where people are brought together and 
engage across cultures to conduct business. The unique features of Eastleigh are especially 
visible as businesses and residential housing are simultaneously present in the area. This 
generates a vibrant atmosphere and a vivid flow of businesses as integrated at the core of 
everyday life in the community. 
Several of our informants shared a common reason when elaborating on, why they chose to 
settle down in Eastleigh when arriving to Kenya9. They all highlighted the concentration of 
                                                 
8 Ahmed Mohamed, appendix, transcript  
9 Habib Alfaruk & Fatima, appendix, interview notes  
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persons of Somali origin in the area as a factor influencing their choice positively. Habib 
Alfaruk10, a Somali student at Nairobi University, accounts that he prefers to live in an area 
together with his “own  community” as they share a common language. He explains that when 
arriving to Kenya without Kiswahili language skills, there is an attraction towards Eastleigh 
where oral communication with other people is immediately accessible. In this way, language 
is understood as constitutive of access to relations, information, and affiliation. 
Alfaruk describes Eastleigh as a community in which he felt included already at the time of 
his arrival. He further expresses that this community and sense of inclusion cannot be found 
elsewhere in Nairobi. Hence, Alfaruk ascribes feelings of affiliation to certain characteristics 
and practices of Eastleigh while distinguishing these from other parts of Nairobi. Other areas 
do not encapture the elements, which combined, constitute a sense of “own  community”  to 
Alfaruk. The feeling of community constitutes an impression of cultural security as certain 
norms and practices (e.g. language competences) are implicit and not existentially contested, 
and thus become naturalized in the context of Eastleigh. 
 
Though Alfaruk perceives the Somali community with positive affiliation, he also 
experiences it as being an area of target, in the eyes of the police: “we  know  we  are  the  
target”. This was especially intensified during the Usalama Watch Operation where roughly 
4.000 persons were arrested and held in detention at Kasarani Stadium (cf. “Constructing   a  
Narrative   of  Alienation”).   Likewise, Egeh11, who is also a student at Nairobi University, has 
experienced that, “as  a  Somali  community  we  face  a  lot  of  problems”. Both Alfaruk and 
Egeh express frustrations about being targeted by the police as a result of being identified as 
part of the Somali community. The affiliation to the Somali community in Eastleigh is thus 
both a source of cultural security because of shared cultural practices, but also a source of 
insecurity as the community, as perceived by Alfaruk, is being reduced to a target of the 
police. 
 
Mohamed expresses a different kind of cultural insecurity. He emphasizes the importance of 
the social practice of “hawala” within   the  Somali   diaspora   community.   “Hawala”   means  
transfer, and defines the informal system of money transfers used for remittances around the 
world. Mohamed explains that, “Over  time  people  use  these  hawalas  for  medical  bills,  rent,  
school  fees,  (...)  to  do  investment  in  Eastleigh  and  also  to  do  business.”. The hawalas are thus 
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vital to the functioning of everyday life, and to maintain basic social and medical needs. In 
this way, the hawalas are expressed as having a cultural value as it is linked to the everyday 
practices of a certain ethnic community. On April 7th 2015, the Kenyan government ordered 
the closing of 13 Somali hawalas on the account that the money transfer systems were being 
used to conduct terrorist activities with regard to al-Shabaab   (“Kenya   closed”,   2015).  
Mohamed stresses that the closing of these hawalas have had extensive negative 
consequences for the Somali community in Eastleigh both individually and collectively. 
Businesses have taken damage and persons have lost their jobs as the hawalas employ a large 
number   of  people   from   cashiers   to  security   guards.  He  states   that   “we have been adversely 
affected”.  As  the  hawalas   are  culturally   founded   and  essential   to  the  everyday   life   of  Somalis,  
Mohamed states that some people feel that the closing is not initiated on the motive of 
fighting terror but rather, to “victimize  a  community”. As persons can no longer do business 
to the same extent as prior to the closing, an essential characteristic constituting the culture of 
Eastleigh as a vibrant business cosmopolitan has been threatened. 
 
It is important to emphasize that even though hawalas may be understood as a cultural 
component, it is not to reject differentiated perceptions of culture and community. As Egeh 
expresses, “By  us  I  mean  students,  by  us  I  mean  Somalis”. This statement shows that the 
sense of affiliation is not only defined through ethnic culture and practices, but also through 
parameters such as education. This is especially expressed in association to the perceived 
degrees of vulnerability and security. Egeh explains that his feeling of being targeted by the 
police has to do with his identification as a student rather than only a target of ethnicity. As a 
student, Egeh may feel more vulnerable as he does not have the same degree of economic 
capacity, and thus not the accessibility to certain power. An economically powerful person 
may on the other hand feel vulnerable as a target to the police as he/she can be identified as a 
source of larger economic output in terms of bribery. 
 
Fatima12 who occupies a third position of being a Somali refugee, explains how she first had 
the impression of Eastleigh as, a “nice  place  to  live”. The concentration of ethnic Somalis 
reminded her of Somalia. However, she stresses that she aspires to return to Somalia 
prospectively. Her life in Eastleigh is thus caused by necessity and characterized by an 
inherent desire of homecoming. To Fatima, the idea of ethnic affiliation was not sufficient in 
                                                 
12 Fatima, appendix, interview notes  
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constituting a sense of community and cultural security. On account of this, it becomes 
evident that there are various narratives of affiliation and community which propose different 
perceptions on the constitution of security and insecurity. This indicates some kinds of 
distinction between different groups, transcending the feeling of togetherness, which the 
informants might share in terms of a common ethnicity.  
 
The narratives of culture and community analyzed above illustrate how different 
characteristics of affiliation are constructed and emphasized differently in terms of the feeling 
of cultural security. The culture of Eastleigh includes specific practices (language, hawala), 
which are contributing to the sense of a shared community. These have been expressed to be 
threatened by closing of money transfer systems, and the targeting of Somalis by the police. 
The threat is articulated and given different meaning by the informants according to their 
perception of vulnerability and accessibility. 
The police in Eastleigh - Abuse of Executive Power  
Through time there have been examples of abusement of violence exercised by the police in 
Kenya. The Human Rights Watch documented in 2013 and 2014 that the executive power in 
Kenya has exploited use of violence against ethnic Somalis (Ghoshal, et al., 2013; Simpson 
& Laper, 2013) which our empirical material also indicates. This paragraph aims to illustrate 
how ethnic Somalis, living in Eastleigh, experience the executive power represented by the 
police in Kenya, and how Somalis perceive their political and cultural security according to 
the  police’s   abuse  of  violence.   Through   our   empirical   material   we  both  observed  
announcements of experienced violence in relation to the police but also individuals who, 
through time and circulating narratives, has constructed and reinforced a fear of the police. 
The skepticism of the police is a general perception in Kenya since it is perceived as the most 
corrupt institution in Kenya (Transparency International, 2015). However, the constructed 
fear and skepticism towards the police must not be seen as an irrelevant fear since it is 
constructed   due  to  one’s   understanding   of  reality,   and  can  potentially   contribute to the feeling 
of being political and cultural insecure. 
   
Several of our informants have experienced physical violence such as punches and sexual 
abuse. One of the informants who experienced violence from the police was the Somali 
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woman, Sadia Adia13. She described how she was attempted raped by the police. Her 
experience of the violence does not stand alone. Also Ahmed Omar14, a Somali refugee, has 
been exposed to arrestments and violence from the police. After refusing to pay a 5.000 KSh 
bribe to a policeman he was arrested and taken to jail. He describes:  
 
“Because, I was very angry, and I said that even if you take me to Hague I will not pay you 
5.000 Shillings, and that angered them even more. And then he made me go into the booth. 
And he squeezed me there, even with his leg. I was afraid I would suffocate when I lied there, 
because there was no air”.    
 
Understood through the conception of political security the incidents of violence as expressed 
by Adia and Omar constitute examples of insecurity as they are representatives of the 
violation of basic human rights. Through our empirical material, one can observe that when 
talking about violent harassment, the informants are pointing out the police as the main 
source violating their basic human rights. The police, who can be seen as the link between 
politicians and the population does not obey the rule of law. This entails that instead of 
maintaining law and order, the police contribute to increasing insecurity and fear around 
Eastleigh.  
According to our informant, Ahmed Mohamed15, a Secretary General of Eastleigh Business 
District   Association,   it   is  not   accidental   who  the  police   are  targeting:   “the police target and 
profile Somalis”.  This   comes   from   an  assumption   that  when   terrorist   activities   are present in 
Kenya, it is the Somali communities that are being targeted as the source of terrorism. 
Mohamed expresses that, “The  police  are  doing  their  work.  They  should  be  applauded  for  
that. As  long  as  they  do  not  harass,  extort  and  intimidate  people”.  According to him, the 
problem arises when the police go into Eastleigh in the night because people feel intimidated 
and victimized. His understanding of the feeling of insecurity towards the police indicates 
that they are targeted because of their ethnicity as Somalis. Fatima16, a Somali refugee, 
supports  Mohamed’s   perspective   as  she  believes   she  is   targeted  by  the  police   because   she  is  
Somali. It seems that their ethnic character makes them suspects leading to brutality carried 
out from a governmental institution. Thus, they feel insecure about being in contact with the 
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police because of their ethnicity which relates to their cultural security. Violation of their 
human rights on the basis of their ethnicity can be seen in relation to both political and 
cultural security.        
 
The daily risk of being arrested even though one may have legal papers is constructed as a 
definite source of insecurity in several narratives. The huge insecurity created is underpinned 
by the fact that the police are perceived as using its authority to blackmail and arrest people 
on the street without evidence. The fear, constructed by the narratives circulating in Eastleigh 
entail that some people feel a need to live in a tactical manner. A Somali student, Sadii17 
claims   that,   “If you see a policeman you will go another way”.  He  elaborates   further   that  
ideally “You  should  run  to  the  police  rather  than  run  away  from  them”. Sadii thus constructs 
a narrative of the police as a violator of rights rather than a source of protection. Likewise, 
Fatima explains how she spotted the police on her way home from work and consequently 
chose to convert her route. Thus she established a tactical way of walking around in 
Eastleigh, out of fear for potential confrontation with the police.  
 
The insecurity which the police pose is also understood as differentiated in terms of 
vulnerability and accessibility as pointed out earlier (cf. “Eastleigh   - a  Somali   Community”).  
The behavior and tactics of the police in accordance to identifying individuals as targets 
transcend   the  broad  category   of   “Somali”.   The   informants   experience   that   the  police  
differentiate   between   individuals   in   practice.   Within   the   ethnic   category   of  “Somali”   various  
sub-categories emerge which appear to have different elements of vulnerability. Despite, that 
all the informants are ethnic Somalis and are inscribed in the physical delimited area of 
Eastleigh, they are treated differently by the police in practice. Ahmed Omar stresses that he 
has experienced this differentiation from before and after he has started working at Refugee 
Consortium, Kenya. Of his present position he states that, “when  I  show  them  [the  police]  my  
card they know somebody who works for a humanitarian organisation cannot bribe (...) they 
just know that I may call my bosses  and  they  will  come  to  secure  my  release”. In this way, 
Omar has gained a certain power through his job and the access to security it entails. As a 
result of this accessibility to a humanitarian organisation the police do not view him as a 
relevant target for bribery. Egeh18, a Somali student at University of Nairobi, explains that he 
sees  a  difference   in  vulnerability   between   the   category   of  ‘students’   and  the   category   of  
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‘businessmen’   as  he  states  that,   “As a Somali community we face a lot of problems. I do not 
know  about  businessmen  but  as  a  student  it  is  hard”. He thus acknowledges a difference in 
position, but does not articulate how this difference is manifested in practice in accordance to 
security and vulnerability. 
These examples illustrate how the police contribute in defining particularly vulnerable 
individuals in certain contexts (e.g. bribery). Individuals can thus gain a higher degree of 
security in specific situations, which constitutes a sense of differentiation of the 
understanding of security   within   the  ethnic   category   of   “Somali”. 
 
From above, one can identify narratives that relate to a feeling of being both political- and 
cultural insecure. Thus violations of human rights on the basis of ethnicity can be seen in 
relation to different aspects of security meaning violence exercised by a government 
institution and ethnic profiling. Their understanding of political insecurity originates from 
incidents of violence and a perception of the police as the main source of violating their basic 
human rights. Further the narratives illustrate how a collectively imagined fear may reinforce 
the   individual’s   fear   of  the  police,   consequently   leading   to  a  tactical   structuring   of  one's  lives  
in order not to encounter the police. 
Usalama Watch - an (in)security Operation 
As explained in the speech act analysis on Usalama Watch, the operation was launched in 
Eastleigh in 2014, to secure the area in regards to all activities perceived as a security threat. 
In a short period of time, a huge amount of people were arrested, which have been highly 
criticized because of its violent and discriminatory character, including the harassment of an 
entire community. Referring to the name Usalama, a Somali student, Mohammed19 explains 
how he thought Usalama Watch would bring more security to the community since 
“Usalama”   means   security. However, this perception changed when he was taken by the 
police   to  Kasarani  Stadium,   as  if   “he was a big criminal”.  Not  because  he  had  committed   a  
crime,   “but because of Usalama”.  Thus,   operation Usalama Watch seems to mark a shift 
towards a more insecure Eastleigh. 
 
This shift is illustrated in the interview with Ilhan Ahmed20, a Somali refugee, who was 
present in Eastleigh during operation Usalama Watch. She experienced the practices of the 
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police during the operation on first hand. Ahmed was arrested during Usalama Watch and 
send to Kasarani Stadium, which was designated to be a Police Station. The police had 
entered her house and moved her by physical force to take her to Kasarani, where she was 
held for two days, until the UNHCR secured her release. Ahmed describes the experience as 
“terrifying”,   saying   that   the   fear   and  political   insecurity   she  experienced   resulted   in  her   not  
leaving the house for nearly three months after her release. The increased insecurity was not 
limited   to  the  actual   operation,   but  had   consequences   for  Ahmed’s   life   even   after  Usalama  
Watch had ended, and thus marked a shift in her perception of security in Eastleigh. While 
the operation was going on, Ahmed would only rarely exit her home, indicating that 
movement outside of the house would increase exposure and risk of confrontation or more 
bad experiences. Thus, the fear and perception of insecurity led to personal restriction of 
mobility. Ahmed further emphasizes how this restricted mobility became transcendent and 
invasive as she felt the need to turn off the lights in order to presuppose absence of human 
activity in the house. She thus acquired a tactical logic by using objects (such as light and 
dark) as a means to create a space of security. The insecurity, which provoked this tactical 
logic may have been caused by the fact that even though she had legal documents, she was 
arrested by the police. This example also shows a lack of political security for the individual 
when   legal   documents   aren’t   enough   to  avoid   arrestment.    
 
Another Somali refugee, Sadia Adia,21 accounted that the harassment towards Somalis 
escalated during the operation and marked a shift in the perception of security in the area. 
Adia has lived in Eastleigh since 1991 where she works as a tailor. In her case, the 
harassment was of physical character as she was insulted and attempted raped by police 
officers. Her personal security was restrained as she was being objectified by the policemen 
stripping her, and thereby violating basic human rights and political liberties. Thus, she is 
being political insecure since her basic human rights are being on-compliance due to sexual 
abusement, which indicates her as more vulnerable of being a woman (United Nations, n.d). 
Adia escaped the situation by screaming whereupon members of the public came to her 
rescue. This constitutes an example of power utilization performed by the police, generating a 
perception of the police as a source of insecurity and threat rather than insurance of security. 
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Fatima22, a 29-year-old mother of three, also emphasized that the Usalama Watch marked a 
shift for Somalis in Kenya. She describes this by emphasizing the attitude towards Somalis 
for the worse changed for the worse during Usalama Watch. The operation thus had far 
reaching consequences for Fatima, in terms of a negative attitude towards Somalis that lasted, 
even after the operation had ended. In this way, the operation is constructed as concerning 
ethnicity, as she perceives it   as  targeting   Somalis.   Fatima’s   expression thus indicates a lack of 
cultural security for the Somali community. 
 
This concern of ethnicity is also identified by a local businessman, Ahmed Mohamed23. As he 
states, “That  operation  was  really  bad.  It  affected business in Eastleigh and it was profiling. 
It  was  targeted  on  Eastleigh  per  se.  Targeting  Somalia  people.” It thus shows how Mohamed 
perceives Eastleigh as not only a delimited area of Nairobi, but as a community defined by 
common ethnic characteristic of being Somali. What is constitutive of Eastleigh then is the 
affiliation to a specific cultural imaginary of a collective identity, and if threatened it 
becomes a concern of cultural security. Usalama Watch was rough on the business sector in 
Eastleigh, but had not only consequences for the economy. For Mohamed it also threatened 
the community-feeling as he perceives Eastleigh, as “A  place  where  everyone  comes  to  do  
their  businesses.  We  get  people  from  other  cultures  working  in  Eastleigh”. 
These narratives reflect a perception of operation Usalama Watch, as an event that marks a 
shift in increased violence and insecurity in Eastleigh. This insecurity is both illustrated 
through extreme cases of physical violence where basic political and human rights are 
violated, and through increased everyday fear and insecurity that these incidents have 
induced. Further, operation Usalama Watch can be perceived, as a mean to cultural insecurity 
as some of its victims expresses the feeling of being targeted in regards to their ethnicity. 
However, this also affects Eastleigh as an area, since there is an understanding of business as 
a vital, cultural part of the community, and thus a new perspective on cultural security is put 
forward.  
(Il)legal Aliens 
Regarding identification documents (ID card) it is clear from the narratives that it is a source 
of insecurity for several refugees living in Kenya. One respondent, Fatima24, has expressed 
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her insecurity related to the ID cards. She and her husband are legally recognized as Somali 
refugees in Kenya and have Alien Cards (cf. “Differentiated   Citizenship”).   During Usalama 
Watch in April 2014, the police came to their house and forced entry. They pushed her and 
her husband around physically, and asked them to pay a bribe of 10.000 KSh, which they 
were not able to. Her husband could not present the relevant documents, as he had lost his ID 
card the previous week, and so the police took her husband into custody. She has not seen 
him since, and she is afraid that he was deported back to Somalia. This illustrates how 
vulnerable and insecure the ID system potentially makes the card holders. When the refugees 
only have a piece of paper to prove their legitimacy in Kenya, and cannot prove their right to 
be in the country otherwise, they become fragile if losing the card. The manner of accounting 
for the presence in Kenya is materialized and inherent in the papers, rather than in the 
individual. The experience of Fatima and her husband is an expression of political insecurity, 
as her husband was not secured the right to stay in Kenya as a result of the missing ID card. 
Their legal status and future lives are extremely dependent on the documentation papers. 
 
However, even when refugees have the relevant documentations, many do not feel that the 
documents provide the security which the refugees expected them to. Ilhan Ahmed25 was 
once arrested by the police who stated that she was supposed to be settled in a refugee camp. 
However, her papers show that she is an urban refugee, and therefore legally justified to live 
and work in Nairobi. Her status as a refugee makes her an easy target for bribery as she has a 
lot at stake if she loses her papers, or if her papers are discarded as fake. The fear of being 
deported to a refugee camp and thus being forced to abandon the everyday life and work in 
Eastleigh, constitutes a strong incitement to accept the conditions of delivering money to 
bribery. This vulnerability decreases her feeling of security, and influences her mobility as 
she is not able to walk in public without fear of being arrested and forced to pay bribes. Even 
though her Alien Card legally should provide her with the right to live and work in the city, 
paradoxically it also makes her an easy target for police bribing. 
This is elaborated in another narrative where Sadia Adia26 explicitly expresses how she does 
not think that the papers are of any use when she is confronted with the police. She says that 
once they find out that a person is a refugee, it is as if the police have “been  giving  the  green 
light” to harass. She believes that the police harasses her mainly because she is a refugee, and 
not because she is Somali. The legal documents she has acquired are potentially sidelined in 
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practice, and in the encounter with the government authorities, including the police, she is 
potentially   identified   as  “illegal”   despite   of  her  documentation.   The  documents   are  thus   not  
the defining factors, the logic and practice of the police are. 
A feeling of insecurity regarding ID card may also be more culturally related. Egeh27, a 
student at Nairobi University, claims that the police is accusing them for carrying fake ID 
cards because they are Somalis. He has another perception of insecurity related to ID cards 
than Adia. For him it is not a question of his refugee status, but rather a question of being 
Somali, and in his perception, the police accuse them of carrying fake ID cards as an excuse 
for harassing the Somali community.   
The different narratives presented in this paragraph illustrate how exposed refugees in Kenya 
are when the legal system does not provide sufficient protection for the refugees living in the 
country. Their legal identity lies in a piece of paper, but if the authority claims it illegal, they 
are not able to prove their legality. This entails that many of the refugees are exposed to pay 
bribes in order to protect themselves from being deported to their country of origin.            
Encountering the Kenyan population 
As mentioned in the prior section on Eastleigh, Somalis and Kenyan Somalis primarily 
inhabit Eastleigh. Some refugees of Somali origin argue that they chose to live in Eastleigh 
because of the familiar circumstances. This might restrain their relations and relationships to 
the national Kenyan population. On this basis, one might assume that such dividing structures 
in   society   will   contribute   to  less   reflected   perceptions   and  understandings   of  “the   other”   on  
both sides. Thereby, the individual encounter with the Kenyan population becomes 
interesting in the light of the assumption that Somalis in Kenya are securitized as a threat.  
 
Interviews with ethnic Somalis, living in Eastleigh, give the impression that tensions often 
occur in the encounter with local Kenyans. For instance, the female refugee, Ilhan Ahmed28, 
expresses that when she travels outside of Eastleigh there has been incidents where she has 
felt insulted by the Kenyan population. She states that the insults concerned affiliation of her 
with terrorism since she was called names like al-Qaeda, al-Shabaab, and terrorist. 
Furthermore, she has experienced being mocked for the way she dresses, referring to the 
traditional Muslim hijab. Thus, Ahmed expresses that she is targeted on her ethnicity and her 
religion by the Kenyan population, indicating a feeling of cultural insecurity. In order for her 
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to possibly avoid public insults and associations with terrorism, she would have to take off 
her hijab, and thus renounce from her physical manifestation and visual performance as 
Muslim. Nevertheless, there is no universal perception of the Kenyan population by people 
living in Eastleigh. Sadii29, a Somali student, emphasize that, “We  do not fear the Kenyan 
people - Kenyans  are  amazing  people,  but  we  have  a  problem  with  the  government”, 
indicating that any profiling, ethnic or religious, resulting in an experienced cultural 
insecurity may not always be related to the Kenyan population.  
Fatima30, a refugee woman from Eastleigh, articulates that she believes there has been a 
change in the way she is approached by the Kenyan population. Fatima explains that she has 
many Kenyan friends and neighbors in Eastleigh. However, she states that their attitude 
towards her have changed with the intensified terror attacks. From time to time they confront 
her by articulating insults such as, “Kenyans  have been killed - go  back!”.  
Also Ahmed Omar31, a Somali refugee who works for Refugee Consortium, Kenya, 
expresses that even though he has many very good kenyan friends, he has experienced a 
change   in   Kenyans’   attitude.   He  argues   that   a  change   in   attitude   is to a larger extent related to 
a  religious   division,   “it is only these days that, recently when al-Shabaab started a new tactic 
of separating people on religious ground, releasing Muslims, and massacring Christians, 
who had angered Kenyan population”.  Omar clearly states that the problem of religion is a 
consequence of al-Shabaab. This anger, following religious division, is more likely to have 
negative consequences on Somalis as they are predominantly Muslims. Associating al-
Shabaab with Muslims may consequently affect the cultural security of the Somali 
community   in   and  outside   of  Eastleigh,   which   Fatima’s   experience   with   her  neighbor  
constitutes an example of. Another example was given by Habib Alfaruk32 from the Somali 
Student Association. At an informal meeting, he told us about an incident riding a Matatu 
(Kenyan minibuses) along with a friend, on their way home from the university. Another 
Somali student, attending the same University, followed to take the same Matatu. However, 
the third guy carried a big bag, and the instant he stepped into the Matatu everyone hushed 
out immediately. The driver insisted that he would not drive the bus as long as he was on 
board. Alfaruk explained that this is how many Kenyans react when a Somali enters a Matatu 
carrying a large bag. He expressed how that made him feel discriminated on behalf of his 
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ethnicity, as same incident would not happen for a Kenyan. However, while Alfaruk feels 
targeted by the Kenyan population, he elaborates that he does not have any problem with his 
fellow Kenyan student. This indicates that there is a difference concerning the experience of a 
general attitude from the Kenyan population, and the experience involving personal relations 
to Kenyans. This differentiation may be caused by a tendency to attribute persons with 
specific collective characteristics of identity through symbols if one does not have a personal 
relation   to  the   “other”.   When   individuals   constitute   personal   relations   the  persons  are  
attributed an individual identity based on individual characteristics rather than collective 
symbols. 
Clive Hamoudi33 a local, Muslim community leader supports this argument. Hamoudi is a 
well known character in the community as he is the representative of the Nyumba Kumi 
initiative in the area. Concerning   the  Kenyan   population’s   perception   of  Somalis,   Hamoudi  
states   that,   “Right now people consider Somalis and terrorists the same. That is the general 
perception.”.  As  a  community   leader,   it   is   his   experience   that  Somali   ethnicity   has  become  a  
symbol of terrorism, in many Kenyans. 
 
These examples show how both ethnic Somalis and Muslims experience verbal and symbolic 
targeted when encountering the Kenyan population, and consequently feel culturally insecure. 
However, there seems to be a different perception of the character of the relation between 
Kenyans   and  Somalis,   when   talking   about  Kenyan   people   in   closer   relations.   An  “us   and  
them”   feeling   may  be  more   likely   to  evolve   when   attributing   people  with   collective   symbols  
of identification. The narratives indicate that Kenyans may have a fear toward perceived 
signs of terrorism including Somali features and symbols of Islam. On this behalf, one can 
argue that the dividing structures in society might be contributing to less nuanced perceptions 
and relations between Somalis and Kenyans. 
Perceived misrepresentation is lack of political security 
Among interviews conducted with ethnic Somalis, living in Eastleigh, the narratives 
constitute a general impression that political security, institutionalized as the government and 
secured by the police as an organ acting on behalf of the government, is lacking. In this study 
political security is perceived as freedom from dictatorship and arbitrary government, 
represented in society as respect for rule of law, human rights, equality and inclusiveness (cf. 
“Political   and  Cultural   Security”).   However, the Somalis cannot be understood as one group 
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in regards to political influence, but are divided in Somali Somalis and Kenyan Somalis34. 
This seems to influence the feeling of being represented politically and able to influence the 
system.  
Fatima35, a Somali woman and refugee, expresses a dissatisfaction with Yusuf Hassan, who is 
the county representative of Eastleigh in the Parliament, as she does not feel that he is able to 
represent her interests. This is due to the fact that Yusuf Hassan is of Somali origin but a 
Kenyan Somali and not a Somali Somali. Fatima thus constructs a division between two 
categories within the broader category of ethnic Somalis in Kenya. As a result of Yusuf 
Hassan   as  inscribed   within   the  group  of  “Kenyan-Somali”   Fatima   rejects  a  collective   we-
identity in the category of ethnic Somalis. The Somali student, Habib Alfaruk36 supports this 
distinction, as he does not feel that the Somali ethnic characteristic is an adequate parameter 
for the feeling of political representation. Though he recognizes the presence of Somalis in 
the political system, he states that “We [the Somali diaspora in Kenya] are divided in my 
view. They [Kenyan-Somalis] have more confidence  because  of  the  Kenyan  ID”. Likewise, 
Fatima expresses that she does not perceive Somali Somalis and Kenyan Somalis as a part of 
the same people. They both emphasize the lack of collectivity. The example of Fatima is 
categorized as more of a personal experience, in the way she finds that Kenyan Somalis do 
not acknowledge and understand her experiences of fleeing and becoming a refugee. The 
example of Alfaruk attach a sense of collectivity and representation to the legal status of 
individual, as lack of legal status limits him from the collectivity. 
 
Another Somali refugee woman, Sadia Adia37, expresses that she is aware of the possibility 
of addressing local politicians in Eastleigh. In spite of this, she expresses that she does not 
intend to seek assistance, as she does not view the politicians as credible. Adia thus lacks 
trust in the value of the assistance that the politicians can deliver. She does not view the 
political system as a forum for obtaining representation as a refugee, and she emphasizes that 
she is only comfortable when engaging with humanitarian organisations. Perceiving the 
humanitarian   organisations   as  one’s   political   representative   is   supported  by  Ilhan   Ahmed38, a 
refugee   woman   living   in   Eastleigh.   Ahmed   attributes   the   ‘refugee   status’   great importance as 
                                                 
34 The terms Somali Somali and Kenyan Somali is referring to Kenyan Somalis living in Kenya having 
citizenship,  while Somali Somalis is referring to Somali refugees living in Kenya.   
35 Fatima, appendix, interview notes  
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she defines her representative to be the UNHCR rather than the Kenyan political system. 
However,   this   perception   of   the  humanitarian   organization   as  one’s   political   representative  
might be constructed in light of interests. As a refugee woman, Fatima states, she does not 
perceive Kenyan politicians as being able to relate to actual refugees experiences while 
UNHCR does, according to prior examples. Thus, it is in the local Somali refugees interest to 
ensure political security by providing legitimacy to a political system they believe in, 
meaning UNHCR, even with no regards of its lack of legislative and executive power.  
 
The Somali student, Sadii39, puts forward another perception of why he does not feel 
represented by the government. He states that the core issue in the Kenyan political and legal 
system is that the rule of law is not respected. He argues that the perceived discrimination 
against Somalis in Kenya is not an issue between ethnic groups in the population. Rather it is 
a result of an insufficient legal system. The Somalis cannot gain security through the court 
system as it is not legitimate and taken seriously by executive and legislative persons in 
power. According to him, the deficit in the legal system causes political insecurity on the 
ground, as the civil rights of the people are not respected and has no ultimate consequences 
within a legal framework. The lack of security through government institutions has the effect 
that a lot of people have fled from Eastleigh, and others are getting ready to move. Ahmed 
Omar40, a Somali refugee who works at RCK, follows this more antagonistic construction of 
the relation between Somali refugees and the political system in Kenya, as he feels, “that  the  
political system in Kenya is against us.  The  Somali  refugees”. By identifying the target group 
as  “Somali refugees”  Omar   inscribes   an  ethnic   dimension   to  the   issue,   as  he  does  not  
articulate the issue as limited to refugees and migration flows, and thus relates the issue to the 
notion of cultural security. 
Omar further illustrates the power of language and discourse, as he states that:  
 
“There  are  a  lot  of  conspiracy  theories  surrounding  in  Somali  areas  that  the  bombing  and  
the terrorist attacks are things that the government allows to happen in order to get the green 
light to maybe crack down on us [Somali   refugees]”. 
 
 Through   such   ‘conspiracy   theories’   fear   and  distrust   toward   the  political   system   can  be  
produced and reproduced. The evidence and accuracy of such conspiracy theories is not in 
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itself the essential point, but rather the ability of such claims to be anchored in the minds and 
logics of the people. If the claims are constructed as real they have effects in real life and are 
thus infused with a certain productive power. In this way conspiracy theories flourishing in 
Somali areas may be contributing to an imagined fear and insecurity in relation to the Kenyan 
political system. This construction of the government, as having a hidden agenda, creates 
distrust and cultural insecurity as it is articulated as a threat to the Somalis as an ethnic group. 
When Omar talks about actors contributing to insecurity for the Somalis, he does not 
articulate the government and the police as two distinctive actors. His understanding is that 
the police functions as a political tool of the government, which “uses  the  police  to  harass.  
They do not use the name Somalis, they do just use refugees. But you see only the Somalis are 
targeted”. In this way the construction of the problem of ethnic insecurity is being placed on 
one  united   actor  “the   government”,   and  thus,   the  Kenyan   system   as  a  whole.   This   way  of  
constructing the responsible actor through conspiracy theories and place blame, may 
contribute   to  the  understanding   of  an  “us   and   them”   antagonism,   as  the  issue is understood 
through the lenses of a minority, Somalis, versus majority, the government. 
 
In these narratives one can identify elements of political insecurity relating to the fact that 
non-representation in the political system is understood in relation to a division within the 
ethnic group of ethnic Somalis. Thus, Somali Somalis do not see themselves as represented in 
the political system through Kenyan Somalis, which seem to generate a perception of unequal 
rights. Further some narratives emphasize that the Kenyan government is not perceived as an 
actor being able to, or wanting to, represent Somali refugees, why UNHCR is mentioned as 
main organ for political influence. Another perspective on political security is illustrated 
through the distrust regarding the legal system in Kenya, which is perceived as undermining 
the rights of its people. Thus the government is seen as a violating the rights of Somalis in 
regard of influence. Further as causing cultural insecurity through ethnic profiling, as they are 
regarded as to specifically target Somali refugees as a subgroup.   
Sub-conclusion 
Through the narratives above, one can identify and investigate how initiatives taken from a 
political level can have a local effect on ethnic Somalis.  
The two concepts, political- and cultural security, were identified before entering the field, 
but have expanded in the process of interacting with the narratives. The different perceptions 
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of security, put forward by the informants, are used for understanding the nuances of political 
and  cultural   security,   and  for  encapsulating   the   informants’   perception   of   security.    
The definition used for the concept political security in this study is “freedom  from  
dictatorship  and  other  arbitrary  government”  (cf. “Political   and  Cultural   Security”). Through 
the narratives a more elaborated understanding of the concept has been put forth by the 
different informants.  
One way of understanding political security is related to everyday security and practices. 
When political security decreases, it affects the practices of the informants’ everyday life.  
One narrative told by Ilhan Ahmed41 shows how the episode at Kasarani Stadium decreased 
her feeling of security so remarkable that she did not go outside of her house for three 
months, as she feared an encounter with the police. It illustrates how the police become the 
source  of  political   insecurity,   and  how  the   insecurity   made  Ahmed   take  “tactical”   decisions  
like staying inside and turning of the light. Another example of political insecurity regards 
the inconsistency between the juridical principles and practices. As illustrated in the narrative 
told by Fatima, her husband lost his ID card and thus seen as illegal by the police, even 
though he had a legal right to stay in the country. Thus their political security decreases in the 
meeting with the police, as they are being perceived as illegal, and thus not secured under the 
rule of law.  
As the examples show, one way in which political security can be affected by the 
government’s   anti-terror strategies, is in the actual meeting with the police, as they are not 
perceived as obeying to the rule of law. Political insecurity, in this specific case, increases out 
of fear of the police as a violator of their human rights, and fear of being perceived as an 
illegal refugee by the police.  
 
Cultural   security   is   defined   by  “freedom from ethnic or religious denomination" (“Political  
and  Cultural   Security”).   In   several   narratives   it   is   evident   how  cultural   insecurity   can  be  
understood through a traditional perception of ethnicity, as for example the case with Egeh42 
who expresses that he feels targeted by the police because he is a part of a Somali 
community. However, the study reached a new understanding of the concept of cultural 
security reflected by the narratives told by one of the informants. As explained by Ahmed 
Mohamed,   business   is   such   an  embedded  part  of  Eastleigh’s   culture,   bringing   people  
together, and making Eastleigh unique. Therefore, when Business was affected negatively by 
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Usalama Watch it became a source of cultural insecurity. Thus it illustrates a new way of 
understanding cultural security, reflecting the narrative told by the informants. The 
government’s   anti-terror strategies,  both affect cultural security negatively in terms of 
feeling targeted because of ethnicity. But it also affect cultural security negatively when 
business is affected as a consequence of operations in Eastleigh.  
These are examples of understandings of political and cultural security, founded in a 
definition of the two concepts, but elaborated on, and given a new meaning, reflecting the 
context in which the concepts occur. By adding meaningful insight from the empirical 
material to the general definition of the concepts, they become more relevant, and are able to 
reflect   the  issues   that   ethnic   Somalis’   in  Eastleigh   are  confronted   with.    
From Eastleigh to Global War on Terror  
The two analyses “Constructing  a  Narrative  of  Alienation”  and “Perceptions  of  Security  in  
Eastleigh” have each contributed to an understanding of, how a discourse is shaped within 
the Kenyan society towards ethnic Somalis as potential terrorists. Throughout this study 
aspects, of an authority constructing a language in order to legitimize actions according to 
countering terrorism, are presented (cf. “Perceptions of Security in Eastleigh”).  This relates 
to  Jackson’s   assumption   that   the  former   Bush   administration   constructed   a  new   language   in  
order to shape a social reality, wherein terrorism is articulated as a threat that able to destroy 
civilization   for   “ordinary people”   (Jackson,   2005,  pp.  1-2). The narrative constructed by the 
Kenyan government is not new, since one can identify tendencies of discriminating 
discourses towards ethnic Somalis in Kenya back in history (Cf. “Constructing a Narrative of 
Alienation”).  However, the language of the Global War on Terror (GWOT) identifies a 
mutual understanding of terrorists as being a common enemy to the international society. The 
references to GWOT in Kenya can be localized in the narratives, presented by the 
government. After the Westgate attack in 2013, Deputy President, William Ruto situated the 
attack in a global context saying, “This  is  not  a  Kenyan  war.  This  is  an  international  war.  
And  we  need  to  join  hands  and  work  together.”  (Boswell, 2013). Not only Ruto sought 
international allies in the aftermath of the Westgate. The Kenyan Foreign Minister Amina 
Mohamed articulated in relation to the attack, “this  is  not  just  al-Shabaab. This is al-Qaeda, 
the hallmarks of al-Qaeda”  (Boswell, 2013). Thus, by associating the attack with al-Qaeda 
she classified the threat as an international enemy and called for a global solution.  
However, the Kenyan government may have different interests in gaining support from the 
international   society.   With   the  U.S.’  plan  of   posting   100  million   dollars   in   Kenya’s   anti-terror 
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strategies, Kenya is highly dependent on aid from USA in order to fight terrorism (Morello, 
2015). In order to get international support and aid, it is essential that the international society 
acknowledge terrorism in Kenya as a global enemy, which they have to counter together to 
overcome. Contextualizing the terror attack in relation of an international discourse of 
GWOT, Kenya can achieve support from the international society.    
 
An urge for international acknowledgement and support, is not only a concern for the 
government. Ethnic Somalis at the local level speak into a discourse of GWOT, when 
distinguishing themselves from terrorism, and when seeking international allies.  
What seems to be concerning the local Somalis in Eastleigh the most, is how terrorism has 
taken religion as a hostage turning Islam into the enemy. Mohammed43, a Somali student, 
expressed how, 
 
“Islam  is  not  terrorism and terrorism is not Islam. It is our responsibility as Muslims to 
explain this. Let us not let the terrorist use the name of Islam. The ones who are the terrorists 
are the ones who violate the rights but they shall not call it Islam.“ 
 
He raises a concern about, how all Muslims are being victimized and further tries to draw a 
clear line between terrorism and Islam. In his pursuit of creating Muslims as a category 
distinguished from terrorists, he calls for international solidarity, as he emphasizes the 
Muslims’   responsibility   to  draw  attention   to  this   distinction.   He  recognizes the ethnic and 
religious   tensions,   which   terrorism   has  brought   about,   and  tries   to  eliminate   the  “us   vs.  them”  
rhetoric between Westerners and Muslims. He wishes to draw a clear line between terrorists 
and  ‘the   rest’:   “The hate in the society can create ethnic clashes; the hate must not come out 
of  control.  It  is  an  international  enemy”. Thus, by contextualizing terrorism in Kenya within 
the discourse of GWOT, he wishes to cross religious boundaries and establish an 
international ally to fight terrorism, as their common enemy. This indicates that ethnic 
Somalis are being affected by the international discourse about terror, interpreted through the 
Kenyan   government’s   counter-terror strategies. But GWOT does not only affect top-down 
from a global to a local level. Also, from a local and a national level, people raise their 
opinion on GWOT, and suggest how Kenyans and Somalis should influence the international 
terror agenda. 
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Chairman of Nyumba Kumi, Clive Hamoudi44 shares  Mohammed’s   view,   making   it   clear   that 
al-Shabaab has nothing to do with the religion of Islam:  
 
“We  don’t  even  believe  al-Shabaab are Muslims. (...)  al-Shabaab does not represent Islam, 
Muslims or the Quran. They just use the Islamic court for political convenience. they are not 
one of us. And  we  do  not  agree  with  them.“ 
 
Hence, he tries to create a clear distinction between terrorism and Islam, and just like 
Mohammed, he stresses how Muslims do not support the course of al-Shabaab. Instead, he 
expresses how the Muslim community has engaged in demonstrations, and arranged blood 
banks  for   the  victims   in  Garissa   in   order  to  express   their   sympathy.   Thus,   to  eliminate   the   “us  
vs.  them”   discourse   between  Muslims   and  Christians.    
 
Both on a national level and on a local level, Kenyans and Somalis try to gather international 
support and acknowledgement, in order to gain support in the fight against terror, and to 
distinguish themselves from the terrorists. They may have different motives and means of 
doing so, but it illustrate, how GWOT does not have a one-way affect on the national and 
local level: Kenyans and Somalis are not passively receiving the global discourse, but 
interacting with it, trying to affect the international agenda of GWOT.  
Conclusion 
This study was initially inspired by an astonishment of, how the articulation of a Global War 
on Terror (GWOT) as a political discourse, could have impact on individuals at a local level. 
In Kenya, confrontations between the government and an ethnic minority, the Somali 
community, have been articulated in relation to specifically the war on terror. However, as 
the study has aimed to bring forward, the articulation of an ethnic minority group as, directly 
or indirectly, associated to terrorism have both local, individual, physical, and mental 
consequences. This conclusion has been investigated throughout the current study. It has been 
analyzed how anti-terror strategies in Kenya, can be understood through: constructivist 
lenses, the means of securitization theory, and notions of political and cultural security. The 
securitization move concerns the articulation of an existential threat toward a referent object. 
When constructing such a referent object, the securitizing actor must define the nature and 
identity of the object through a speech act. In this case the securitization move has 
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consequently   included   some,  while   excluded   others,   as  the   referent   object  is  “Kenyans”   and  
thus nationally and ethnically constituted. This study argues that the nature of the speech act, 
as inclusive of some and exclusive of others, can have roots in the production and 
reproduction of historical narratives. As explored through the first analysis “Constructing  a  
Narrative  of  Alienation”, the narrative of Somalis, their position, and difference in regard to 
ethnic Kenyans, are historically rooted. Since decolonization and the Shifta War, Somalis 
have been constructed, and constructing themselves, as different from Kenyans, thus rejecting 
a common we-identity and a national affiliation to Kenya. During that time the articulation of 
the  war  as  one  of  “Shiftas”,   can  be  understood,   as  a  means   of  constructing   a  security   threat  
from the secessionist Somalis - the   “others”   who  were  not  Kenyan   at  heart   nor  mind.   Thus,  
the   articulation   of   “the  others”,   contributes   to  the   creation   of   a  collective, Kenyan, we-
identity excluding ethnic Somalis living in Kenya specifically. 
 
It is argued that the same consequences of securitizing moves take shape today. The point of 
the speech act analyses, of William Ruto and Ole Lenku, is thus to show, how they seek to 
legitimize actions out of normal political procedure; namely the closing of Dadaab and 
Usalama Watch Operation. However, these securitization moves cannot only be understood 
through the dichotomous relation of success or failure, depending on the acceptance from the 
audience. They also have spillover effects to the Somali community- identity, as the 
community   is   constructed   as  an  “existential   threat”.   When   a  threat   is   articulated   and  assigned  
on an ethnic community, the dynamics of inclusion and exclusion can contribute to social 
conflict,   as  analyzed   in   “Perceptions of Security in Eastleigh”, through the perceived 
difficulties of encounter between Somalis and Kenyans. The speech act and securitization 
move is thus seen as a powerful tool of depersonalizing a group through prototypical 
representation   (e.g.  terrorism).   In  this   case  the   representation   of   “Somalis”   as  associated   to  
terrorism   in  Kenya   assigns   “threat”   and  “fear”   to  signs   and  symbols   of  the  Somali  
community. As the analysis argued it can lead to public harassment, as exemplified with 
Ilhan Ahmed, who were mocked due to her religious, symbolic appearance through the hijab. 
These experiences become embedded in the self-categorization, as they contribute to the 
personal narratives of the informants. In this way, the manner in which security issues are 
defined and practiced on a national level affects the sense of identity and community on a 
local level. Furthermore, one can argue, if the Kenyan population, as Ilhan states, perceive 
Somalis as affiliated with terrorist organizations, it will support the claim that the government 
succeeds in making a security move toward Somalis in Kenya as a threat. 
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The notions of political and cultural security have thus contributed to the understanding and 
conceptualization   of  the   informants’   experienced   consequences   of  articulations   and  initiatives  
by the Kenyan government. Both concepts have been articulated differently by the informants 
cf. the “Perceptions of Security in Eastleigh”,  and   thus   assigned   different meanings. Cultural 
and  political   security   are  thus   constructed   through   our  analysis   of  the   informants’   individual  
reality. One of the main sources of insecurity, expressed by the Somali informants, is the 
police. The police is expressed to pose insecurity, both in terms of cultural and political 
security, as they are perceived to differentiate when confronting persons in Eastleigh. Our 
informants articulate that the police thus create an environment of a distinct social and 
political order, where vulnerability, insecurity, and negative differentiated accessibility is the 
result. On one hand the police is constructed as a cultural threat, as their presence in the 
community have an impact on the cultural business life, which is vital for the area both 
collectively and individually. On the other hand, the police is constructed as a political threat, 
as they disregard the expected legitimacy of identification documents and are able to do so, as 
expressed by some informants, because of the lack of rule of law. 
Thus,   to  answer   the  problem   statement   of  this   study,   the  Kenyan   government’s   anti-terror 
operations in Eastleigh, can be understood through securitization theory as actions out of 
normal   political   procedure,   targeting   local   ethnic   Somalis’,   which   consequently affect both 
their political and cultural security.         
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